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ABSTRACT 
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 international capital markets trembled of 
uncertainty and investors did not know where the markets were heading. The market turmoil also had an 
impact on Sweden and especially on the banking sector due to the interdependence of international 
financial markets. Some Swedish banks were granted support through a guarantee program that was 
offered by the Swedish government. The Swedish banking sector is relatively unique in an international 
comparison when looking at the degree of market concentration. Four large banks, “The Big Four”, 
dominate the market and have a market share of more than 80%. These are Swedbank, SEB, Nordea and 
Handelsbanken. The purpose of this thesis was to investigate to what extent a set of macroeconomic 
factors presented on a daily basis could be used to explain the stock performance of these banks before 
and after the crash of Lehman Brothers by comparing similarities and differences between the four banks. 
The macroeconomic factors whose impact were analysed were changes in CDS-spreads as a proxy for 
default risk, Swedish T-bills, the Stockholm OMX 30 Index, the SEK/Euro exchange rate, the Amihud 
illiquidity measure as a proxy for growth in industrial production, Swedish term structure of interest rates 
and unanticipated changes in oil price. The empirical work was done by constructing an econometrical 
multifactor model by using daily data for the variables over the years 2005-2012 where adjustments to 
data issues such as heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation were made by using Newey-West estimators.  
The results showed that there were both differences and similarities in the impact of the macroeconomic 
factors on the four bank stocks. Swedbank and SEB were clearly more affected by changes in CDS-spreads 
than for example Handelsbanken even though the statistical significance fell after the Lehman Brothers 
crash. The reason for this might be that the risk exposure of the banks changed after the crash. In the cases 
where changes in the SEK/Euro were statistically significant it affected stock returns negatively. The 
reason for this might be the higher borrowing costs when borrowing in Euro. Handelsbanken 
distinguished themselves from the others and was the only bank for which changes in T-bills had a 
positive correlation with stock returns after the crash. This suggests that the market viewed the 
Handelsbanken stock as a substitute for Swedish T-bills after the crash with lower risk than the other bank 
stocks. In addition, this was confirmed by analysing the market risk for each of the stocks after the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The results showed that the stock performance of each bank was more 
dependable on the overall market performance during the period after the crash. The Handelsbanken 
stock turned out to have the lowest degree of market risk followed by Nordea, Swedbank and SEB.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this section the background, scope and aim of this thesis will be presented 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 can be viewed as the starting point for one of the 
most severe global financial crises since the Great Depression in the early thirties. The fact that one of the 
world’s major investment banks collapsed caused the global financial markets to tremble of great 
uncertainty of where the markets were heading. The collapse of Lehman Brothers combined with the 
following uncertainty had effects that transmitted all over the world, leading to a global recession of 
monstrous magnitude.  
At the same time in Sweden the government had great concerns dealing with problems within the 
Swedish banking sector in the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman brothers. Many of the banks struggled 
for their daily survival in an environment and time characterized by both anxiety and protectionism. For 
instance, the Swedish National Debt Office had to step in as owner for Carnegie, one of the major 
investment banks in Scandinavia, until the markets were stabilized. The larger commercial banks in 
Sweden, especially Swedbank, lost customers to banks of smaller size due to the growing uncertainty. The 
basis for the uncertainty in the case of Swedbank largely had its explanation in the bank’s extensive 
operations in the Baltic States.  
The financial crisis that broke out after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy had a severe impact on the global 
economy and this in turn had an effect on the performance of individual corporations. This type of 
macroeconomic factors can be used to explain the performance of an individual company. But it is not 
certain whether the same macroeconomic factors will have similar causal effects on various corporations. 
The explanation for this may lie within firm specific factors such as size, industry and risk exposure, even 
though variations within the same industry might occur.  
The Swedish banking sector largely differs from other international banking markets, such as the German 
banking industry. Wissén and Wallgren (2009) state in their article about the Swedish financial sector that 
the four largest banks in Sweden together have a market share of more than 80% of the total banking 
industry in Sweden compared to the German banking sector where Deutsche Bank, which is one of the 
larger banks in the world, only has a market share of 5%. The Swedish banking sector is so to speak more 
concentrated in the number of actors, than for example the German sector. The four Swedish banks that 
Wissén and Wallgren discuss in their article are Swedbank, Nordea, Handelsbanken and SEB and for the 
sake of simplicity they will be referred to as the “Big Four” in the rest of the thesis.  
Since Sweden is a small open economy and the Swedish banking sector exhibits such a high degree of 
concentration in the number of actors one could intuitively imagine that global macroeconomic factors 
should have an impact on the performance on Swedish corporations in general and, thereby, an effect on 
the performance of the Big Four. But it is questionable if the same macroeconomic factors have the same 
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causal effects or the same magnitude and statistical significance on each of the Big Four. In this thesis the 
focus will lie on the analysis of the impact of chosen macroeconomic factors on the stock performance of 
the Big Four. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) present a number of macroeconomic factors that affects stock 
returns when they try to explain economic forces that have an impact on stock markets. These factors will 
be the basis for this analysis but with some adjustments made to enable the use of daily data. One factor 
that will be analyzed is the counterparty default risk, where a Credit Default Swap will be used as a 
proxy. This is interesting due to recent events in the global economy, where the ongoing European 
sovereign-debt crisis might have put more focus on the risk of default within the financial markets than 
earlier. Also the crisis that occurred after the collapse of Lehman brothers might have had an impact on 
the macroeconomic effects on stock performances. Therefore the Lehman Brothers crash will be set as the 
delimiter for what will be called before and after the crisis in this thesis.  The other factors whose impact 
will be investigated are the performance of the overall stock market, fluctuations in SEK/Euro exchange 
rates, unanticipated changes in oil price, changes in the interest rate of Swedish T-bills, changes in the 
term structure of Swedish interest rates and changes in Amihud’s measure, included as a proxy for 
growth in industrial production.. These factors and their possible impact will be explained in more detail 
in the theory section of this thesis. 
1.2 AIM 
As mentioned in the introduction SEB, Swedbank, Nordea and Handelsbanken are commonly referred to 
by media and others as the Big Four. It would therefore not be unreasonable to believe that their risk 
exposure should be somewhat alike. The financial sector and especially the banking sector are in many 
ways different from other sectors such as food, garment and manufacturing. Even though banks in many 
ways differ from other sectors when it comes to products and services that are offered to customers, the 
connection between banks and all of these industries cannot be ignored. Banks are more than other 
corporations exposed to the performance of these companies because their business idea basically is to 
support companies and other institutions with liquidity in the form of lending activities and acquisition of 
corporate and government bonds. One risk associated with this is something called counterparty risk, 
which can be described as the risk that counterparties will not be able to repay what they owe the bank. 
The risk that a company defaults is undoubtedly higher in times of economic instability and uncertainty. 
Because a bank’s main operations lie within the field of lending and borrowing, the default of many 
borrowers at the same time would certainly harm the performance of the bank. Based on this, a bank is 
reasonably very dependent on the financial climate and by that, banks’ stock performances highly depend 
on the performance of some important macroeconomic factors. This lays the foundation for what this 
thesis is built upon and so the purpose of the thesis has its basis in this theory.  
“The purpose of this thesis is to examine to what extent macroeconomic factors presented on a 
daily basis can be used to explain and compare the individual performance of four bank stocks 
before and after the crash of Lehman Brothers.” 
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1.3 SCOPE 
This is an econometrical study that focuses exclusively on the stock returns for the Big Four over the years 
2005-2012. Stock returns will be studied without adjustments for dividends or seasonality. The reason 
why this study focuses on the Swedish banking sector is due to its unique characteristics compared to 
international banking sectors and also because of the close interdependence between international banks 
all over the world. The results of this thesis will only be valid for the stocks that have been analyzed, even 
though the results may lead to further discussions. The factors examined in this thesis do not themselves 
explain all of the variation in stock returns. However, they are selected on the basis of previous empirical 
works and literature combined with economic reasoning and they all represent important economic 
factors that are believed by the authors of this thesis to affect stock returns. The reason for this is that the 
limit has to be set somewhere and creating a model with too many variables may lead to difficulties in 
analyzing causal effects. No firm-specific factors will be accounted for in the econometrical analysis. The 
reason for this is that this thesis is based on the macroeconomic theory of Chen, Roll and Ross (1986). The 
main objective is to compare differences and similarities of the macroeconomic effects between the 
different banks before and after the crisis.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section literature and theories on which this thesis is based are presented 
2.1 MULTI-FACTOR MODELS 
There are many factors that affect the expected returns of a particular stock. These factors could be firm or 
sector specific which means that they are specific for a particular company or industry. A good example of 
a firm specific factor could be that the performance of a company changes due to a new CEO. But there 
are also factors that have an effect on the performance of all firms. These factors are called systematic or 
macroeconomic factors, for example GDP growth or exchange rates. Factors like these affect all companies 
but still different companies can have a different degree of sensitivity to a particular macroeconomic 
factor.  The type of model that is being tested in this thesis is a multiple-factor model which means that 
several factors are included as explanatory variables. The factors that will be tested are those presented in 
the introduction. The model has the following properties 
 
      ∑         
 
   
 
     
where    is the rate of return of asset i,    a constant,     the factor sensitivity for asset i of factor k,   is the 
factor k and    is a random error term. It lies within the nature of the model that the number of 
explanatory variables is unknown and have to be empirically tested for. This could be exercised through a 
statistical and econometrical analysis by testing the statistical significance of the variables. A famous 
(2.1) 
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multi-factor model for explaining stock returns is the arbitrage pricing theory (Ross, 1976). In this model 
the number of factors is unknown and the model is therefore said to be a K factor model. The model 
assumes that capital markets are perfectly competitive and that investors always prefer more to less 
wealth.   The main aim of the model is to test the significance and the magnitude of the factor sensitivity 
for a particular asset. By determining relevant factors for a certain stock or asset, it is possible to spot 
mispriced assets in the financial markets and investors will then try to exploit these opportunities to make 
profits. Over the years several studies within the subject have been made where researchers have tested 
the statistical significant effects of various explanatory variables on stock returns. Some factors seem to be 
problematic to find empirically consistent answers to. For example Reinganum (1981) found that firm size 
is a significant explanatory variable when explaining asset returns, a factor that was found insignificant 
by Ross (1983). Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) find five factors significant in their famous paper. Firstly, in 
their empirical research, they found the monthly growth in industrial production to be significant. This 
growth rate is expressed as an index of the business cycle in the economy. The second factor they find 
significant is the change in default risk premium. This is measured as the change in the default risk 
premium on the financial markets over a specific time period. They also find yield curve which can be 
defined as the term structure between long and short term interest rates on government bonds over time 
statistically significant. The three factors mentioned are considered to be highly significant but they also 
find unanticipated inflation and changes in expected inflation significant but more weakly.  The 
conclusion that can be drawn from their results is that unanticipated inflation and changes in expected 
inflation have a smaller statistical significance than the growth in industrial production; changes in 
default risk premium and the yield curve when explaining stock returns. These results are confirmed by 
Conner and Korajczyk (1993).  
2.2 EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
In the efficient market hypothesis, market efficiency is a measure of the degree of how well relevant 
information is incorporated into asset prices. A central part of this thesis is to empirically test what effects 
a specific set of macroeconomic factors have on the stock returns of four Swedish banks. Researchers have 
long tried to find possible explanations to stock price movements by trying to observe patterns in 
historical pricing data. The British statistician Maurice Kendall was not able to reveal any patterns that 
could be used for stock price predictions in his analysis of economic time series in 1953 (Kendall, 1953). 
When these results were presented they were interpreted as a proof that price movements on 
international stock markets to a high degree moved randomly and chaotically due to psychological 
factors. Subsequently, researchers later changed their view on Kendall’s results. Bodie states that random 
stock price movements is an indication of that the market is well-functioning (Bodie et. al, 2011). That 
means that if it is not possible to find any patterns in stock price movements based on all relevant 
information, the market is efficient and only unexpected events have an impact on asset prices. For 
instance when a listed company releases its quarterly report and the company has performed worse than 
expected, the stock price tends to fall, and vice versa. These shocks are immediately reflected in asset 
prices if the market is informational efficient. That means that daily shocks cause immediate reflections in 
stock prices.  
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2.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The focus of this section is to present certain characteristics of all dependent variables used in this thesis. 
All information is collected from annual reports from 2004 to 2011.     
2.3.1 SWEDBANK 
 
FIGURE 2.1 
Swedbank’s core business lies within serving private customers as well as small and medium sized 
companies especially in their home markets Sweden, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Today Swedbank has 
approximately 4 million clients in Sweden and 3.8 million clients in the Baltic States. 
With a pronounced strategy that focuses on internationalization determined by the members of the board 
in the early 2000, Swedbank continued to increase their presence in the Baltics States in 2005 through the 
acquisition of one of the leading banks in the region. Hansa Bank became part of the Swedbank group and 
the economic outlook for the Baltics was nothing but positive at this time.  The economic growth 
continued throughout the year of 2006 and an agreement was concluded regarding the acquisition of the 
Ukrainian Bank TAZ-Kommerzbank. This was a further step associated with the banks 
internationalization process which smoothed well in times of economic growth and financial stability. At 
this time the company’s focus on Eastern Europe was unquestionable. Although financial markets 
trembled during 2007, Eric Stålberg, President of the Board, proudly asserted it as the bank’s best year so 
far.  The year after would be recognized as a year characterized by financial issues, defaults and 
uncertainty about the future, as one of the leading banks in the Baltic States Swedbank had to face the 
significant negative effect the financial disease had on those markets. Of course this was to be reflected in 
the stock price which declined in value by approximately 75% over 2008. Swedbank was severely affected 
by the new financial climate. In November 2008 the Swedish National Debt Office granted Swedbank’s 
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application to take part of the guarantee program which was a promise by the Swedish State to step in as 
guarantor in case Swedbank would not be able to fulfill its obligations.   
If 2007 was one of Swedbank’s most successful years in history, 2009 was on the other hand one of the 
worst years for the bank so far. Banks with a high level of risk exposure was harmed more than others by 
the financial crisis and Swedbank was at this time maybe the Swedish bank with the highest level of risk 
exposure. Much of the risk can be derived from operations in the Baltic States. Lending activities 
following the years from 2005 to 2008 in these countries is according to Michael Wolf, CEO, one 
explanation why Swedbank suffered in some ways more than other Swedish banks from the financial 
crisis. It was not only hurtful to the balance sheet but also the public reputation of the bank was harmed.  
After the crisis it seems like Swedbank realized more than ever the importance of solid finances and risk 
management. After the trembling period Swedbank reduced their overall risk exposure. Even some core 
values were reformulated.  
This tells the story of a bank that suffered from mistakes and maybe learned something from a period that 
could have ended even more dramatically than it did.   
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2.3.2 SEB 
 
In Sweden and the Baltic states SEB offers a wide range of financial services. The focus in Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Germany is on corporate and investment banking. The international characteristic 
of SEB is reflected in their presence in over 20 countries. 
With over 4 million clients and 17,000 employees worldwide SEB is a major player in the Swedish banking 
sector. SEB focuses its businesses towards corporate and institutional clients as well as retail banking. The 
acquisition of the Ukrainian Bank Agio in 2004 was part of SEB’s strategy to expand their businesses to 
Eastern Europe. Annika Falkengren became CEO of SEB in 2005 and the same year Marcus Wallenberg 
took on the role as president of the board after Jacob Wallenberg. That year half of SEB’s earnings were 
generated on the Swedish market while the rest were generated abroad. At this time the economic outlook 
was positive both for the bank and the economy as a whole. The SEB stock had experienced great growth 
both in 2004 and 2005. This was to continue even in 2006 with a 33% increase in stock value. The prospects 
of the future were positive even though Marcus Wallenberg raised some concern over the American 
economy. At this time SEB could offer all of their banking services in Sweden, Germany, Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia.   
After several years with positive returns, the economic downturn during the second half of 2007 had a 
negative effect on the SEB stock.  The stock decreased by 24% mostly due to problems with the American 
sub-prime market. This gave rise to uncertainty among market participants and widened credit spreads 
on financial derivatives. Increased spreads forced SEB to realize valuation losses in fixed income 
portfolios. The credit loss ratio for the year was 0.11%, an increase by 0.03% compared to the year before. 
Problems continued throughout the year of 2008 with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as the main 
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incident. Credit loss ratios peaked and reached 0.30%, a significant increase compared to previous years. 
Due to concerns in the Baltics, SEB increased their capital reserves to be able to face further defaults.  
After the crisis SEB focused on enhancing their balance sheet and to retain liquidity within the company. 
When one could hope for some stability in the world economy new concerns rose on financial markets in 
2010.  
2.3.3 NORDEA 
 
FIGURE 2.3 
After the completion of the merger of four major banks resident in the Nordic banking sector year 2000, 
Nordea became the largest financial group in Northern Europe with more than eleven million clients in 
the Baltic Sea Region. Their main operations lie within commercial banking and they have approximately 
1400 branches in the Nordic countries and in the emerging markets in Eastern Europe. The Swedish state 
and other Swedish institutions are some of the more influential shareholders but the Sampo group is the 
single largest shareholder. The years that followed after the merger were characterized by efforts to make 
the new bank operate like a single unit on the cross-border banking markets by taking advantage of the 
size, scale and scope of Nordea. This was done by reducing costs and increasing efficiency by outsourcing 
non-core activities like the divestment of real estate assets in 2004. In 2005 the bank increased its activities 
in Poland, Russia and the Baltic States but the main focus was still put on the Nordic countries where 
more than 90% of their operations lie and Sweden was the market where the highest growth rate in the 
bank’s operations was expected. Since the bank mainly has its operations in Sweden, Denmark, Norway 
and Finland their activities are affected by changes in the foreign exchange rates of all the domestic 
currencies of these markets. In year 2007 the financial markets were dominated by turmoil due to the sub-
prime loans in the US but Nordea was only exposed to those loans to a limited extent and stood relatively 
stable. Nordea handled the market uncertainty by focusing more on the relatively more sound and secure 
Nordic banking sector and by slowing down their proceedings of their activities on the markets in Eastern 
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Europe. This was done mainly to remain their AA credit rating. The expectations for the upcoming 2008 
were that the Nordic GDP growth rate would slow down and that the macroeconomic environment 
would be highly uncertain and therefore they expected some net loan losses for 2008. In 2008 the turmoil 
on the financial markets continued with the crash of Lehman Brothers but still Nordea ended the year 
with a positive profit that was 1% higher than the previous year. Their managing of the crisis was 
continued by cutting costs and slowing down expansion. Instead they chose to focus on their current 
clients. During the year Nordea’s borrowing costs were among the lowest of the largest European banks 
due to Nordea’s high credit rating. In 2009 and 2010 Nordea’s share of capital raised on long-term funding 
increased as part of their strategy to keep their high credit rating. 
2.3.4 HANDELSBANKEN 
 
FIGURE 2.4 
Handelsbanken is a Stockholm based bank formed in 1871 whose stock currently is the oldest one traded 
on the Stockholm OMX. The bank mainly operates in its five home markets Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
Finland and the UK. Apart from the five main markets they have business activities in 22 countries 
worldwide with approximately 11,000 employees. Handelsbanken has a relatively decentralized 
organizational structure that put much of the decision making and the customer responsibility on the 
individual bank offices. The two largest shareholders are the investment trust company Industrivärden 
and the employee-owned foundation Oktogonen.  
In 2004 the bank took advantage of the low market interest rates and the rising house prices in Sweden 
which resulted in a 13% increase in their total mortgage loan portfolio. The following year was a good 
year for Handelsbanken with big profits. A trend that they spotted was that the government finances 
developed better in the Nordic countries than in the rest of the Euro zone and the Swedish stock market 
rose by 33%. In 2006 they opened one single branch in Estonia which they saw as a relatively risky 
emerging market with possible future business opportunities. The second half of 2007 was characterized 
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by market turmoil due to the events in the US. Despite the market disturbances Handelsbanken made a 
profit that was 13% larger than the year before, largely due to the sale of the pension company SPP. The 
turbulence of international capital markets continued in 2008 which lead to larger credit losses for the 
bank that year. But the profits were still on a relatively high level due to a large inflow of customers from 
other banks due to the crisis which raised the profits by 4%. Even though financial markets were 
characterized by uncertainty about the future, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s regarded Handelsbanken 
as solid. At the end of the year the Swedish stock market closed at 42% down and the Handelsbanken 
stock lost 39% of its value. Handelsbanken did not receive any economic support from the Swedish 
government during the crisis and in 2009 Handelsbanken had a positive net lending to the Swedish state.  
In 2010 and 2011 the European debt crisis played a big role on the international capital markets but 
Handelsbanken had no direct exposure to any states or banks with large debt issues. Handelsbanken 
continued their international expansion and today they have more than 700 branches in more than 20 
countries. 
2.4 MACROECONOMIC FACTORS AND PROXIES 
In this thesis the goal is to test the effects of seven independent variables on the stock returns of four 
Swedish commercial banks. One factor that will be put in the center of the analysis is the default risk 
measured by a Credit Default Swap index. This financial derivative is used by investors to hedge against 
the default risk exposure that arises in financial markets. This risk could arise due to both changes in firm 
specific and macroeconomic factors. Intuitively, there are of course other factors that affect stock returns 
apart from the default risk. When the only explanatory variable used in the model is default risk the 
importance of default risk will possibly be overestimated. To reduce this bias other explanatory variables 
are included in the model to capture some of the explanatory effect. This gives more precise estimates and 
it is then possible to receive more interesting results when analyzing differences and similarities between 
the four banks. Since the Credit Default Swap is reported daily the other factors used in the model are 
based on daily data as well. A problem with this is that it is not possible to receive daily data for variables 
such as GDP which normally is reported on a monthly basis. Therefore various proxies have been used for 
factors which are not reported daily. Factors and proxies are presented in the following section.  
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2.4.1 A MEASURE OF AGGREGATED FINANCIAL DISTRESS IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY  
 
FIGURE 2.5 
One way companies and governments can raise capital is by issuing bonds. The buyer of a bond is 
exposed to two main risks, interest rate risk and default risk. A bond issue can be viewed as a money loan 
by a company and if the company defaults no, or at least not all money will be repaid to the owner of the 
bond. The buyer of the bond, the creditor, can buy insurance to hedge himself against default risk. One 
such credit derivative is called a Credit Default Swap (CDS). Such swaps are usually traded OTC (Over 
the Counter) and issued by banks or financial institutions. The buyer of insurance obtains the right to sell 
bonds issued by the company for their face value when a credit event occurs, and the seller of insurance is 
obligated to buy the bonds for their face value. Standard terms for a contract are usually between one and 
ten years. Imagine that the same investor that bought the bond also buys a Credit Default Swap to hedge 
against default risk. First of all the investor will receive coupon payments from the bond issuer, but he 
will also have to pay a premium to the seller of default protection. The cost of protection is referred to as 
the CDS spread. The spread can be thought of as an insurance premium paid for any other type of 
insurance. John C. Hull (2011) addresses some of the problems with credit default swaps that many 
regulators became very concerned about during the credit turmoil that started in August 2007.  The 
danger with credit default swaps is that, as with other types of derivatives, that it is a zero sum game. One 
person’s gain is another person’s loss. In the case of a credit event such as a bankruptcy the seller of 
protection has to compensate the buyer of protection for the loss. According to Hull, trading in many 
credit derivatives ceased during the turmoil in 2007 and 2008. Although, trading continued in credit 
default swaps due to the way they are constructed. Compared to many other credit derivatives, credit 
default swaps are very straightforward in the way they insure the buyer of the contract from default risk. 
When Lehman Brothers declared their bankruptcy in September 2008 there was a huge number of 
outstanding CDS -contracts with reference to the big entity. There were predictions that some sellers of 
protection would not be able to reimburse their obligations and that further bankruptcies would occur. 
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Even though everything went smoothly on the day of settlement the systematic risk caused by credit 
default swaps raised concerns with regulators all around the world.  
Market participants have developed indices that track different credit default swap spreads. One such 
index is iTraxx Europe. It is one of the most traded CDS indices and comprises 125 equally weighted 
entities. Entities included in iTraxx Europe are comprised from European companies ranked by Moody’s, 
Fitch or S&P. Companies with a grade corresponding to a BBB grade with negative outlook is excluded 
from the index. The highest ranked entities from the auto, industrial, consumer, energy, TMT and 
financial sectors are included. ITraxx Europe is traded on its spread and therefore mimics its underlying 
instruments (Markit Group Limited). 
Jacobs, Karagozoglu and Peluso (2010) discuss in their article the relationship between CDS-spreads and 
credit ratings. They state in their article that CDS-spreads represent the pure compensation for taking on 
credit risk of the underlying entity.  Their findings suggest that credit ratings made by credit agencies not 
always correspond with relative riskiness of a reference entity. They suggest that the market prices risk 
with CDS-spreads sooner than rating agencies do with their ratings. Hull (2011) suggests that so called 
real world default probabilities estimated using actual default data do not give an appropriate value of 
default risk. Implied default probability from CDS-spreads provides a risk neutral default probability 
which is usually higher than the real-world default probabilities. Risk neutral default probabilities are 
used to value credit default swaps because it incorporates systematic risk. Hull means that a financial 
institution that sells credit protection must evaluate this risk as well, because it is exposing itself not only 
to real world default probabilities but also non-diversifiable risks. Hull states that when the economy does 
badly more companies default and spreads on CDS tend to increase. For the purpose of this thesis the 
CDS-spread will act as a measure of credit risk and financial distress. The objective is to analyze how 
equity returns for the four big Swedish banks reacts to daily changes in CDS-spreads before and after the 
Lehman Brothers crash in September 2008.  
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(2.2) 
2.4.2 A PROXY FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
 
FIGURE 2.6 
Growth in industrial production is often measured in GDP growth which is periodically reported for 
different countries. One macroeconomic factor that Chen, Roll & Ross found to have a statistically 
significant impact on American stock returns was a monthly reported index of industrial production in 
the US (1986). They also used monthly changes in stock price. In this thesis the focus lies on investigating 
possible relationships between stock returns and macroeconomic factors on a daily basis. It is therefore 
problematic to use monthly reported GDP data as a measure for the development of the real economy. 
Naes, Skjeltorp & Odegaard find that stock market liquidity can be used as a good proxy for growth in 
industrial production by analyzing data in Norway and the US over the years 1947-2008 (2010). Their data 
set consists of data for more than 60 years which covers both upturns in the economy and ten recessions. 
The relationship they find between stock market liquidity and the business cycle is strongly significant 
and reveals information about the performance of the real economy. The measure for stock market 
illiquidity that is used in their study is the Amihud measure (Amihud, 2002). It has the following 
properties 
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where     represents the number of days for which the data set spans, |    | represents the return of stock 
i in absolute terms and          is the total trading volume of the market of investigation measured in 
units of currency. The resulting         gives a measure of the daily price impact of the flow of orders 
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which measures illiquidity. The measure provides a daily measure for market illiquidity and 
consequently a proxy variable for the business cycle and the growth in industrial production. 
2.4.3 OIL PRICE 
 
FIGURE 2.7 
The price of oil is one of the macroeconomic factors that Chen, Roll & Ross test for in their analysis of 
economic forces that affect stock prices (1986). They hold oil price as one of the systematic factors that is 
argued to have an impact and influence on stock returns and therefore they include it in their model. Oil 
is both used as an input in the production process and in the supply chain and a change in the price of oil 
thereby has a direct effect on production and transportation costs. This in turn has an impact on prices 
paid by customers which adds to the inflation. Thus, higher oil prices might lead to higher inflation. 
Obviously other inputs and production factors have an effect on the rate of inflation but since oil is used 
to such an extent it is one of the more influential factors in the economy. However, Blanchard and Gali 
(2007) find that the impact of oil price shocks on inflation drastically has changed character since the 70’s 
oil crisis. They find that after 1984 oil prices have had a significantly smaller effect on the rate of inflation 
and the growth in GDP has remained relatively more stable than before 1984. In their article, three 
possible explanations to this matter are presented. Firstly, they spot an international trend leading toward 
more flexible labor markets which allows companies to vary their inputs to a larger extent compared to a 
more inflexible labor market. Secondly, central banks worldwide have changed their policies and now 
focus more on keeping the inflation rate at a more stable level. For instance, the Swedish Central Bank got 
its 2 percentage inflation goal in 1993. Thirdly, they spot that the share of oil used in the production and in 
the overall economy has declined since the 1970’s. In a report from the Swedish Energy Agency (2011) it is 
clear that so is the case also for Sweden since the overall use of oil has decreased by approximately 60% 
since then. But still the usage of oil sums up to roughly 30% of the total energy consumption in Sweden 
which gives it a significant importance for the domestic economy.  
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2.4.4 A PROXY FOR MARKET PERFORMANCE 
 
FIGURE 2.8 
When an investor undertakes an investment she can use differentiation of her portfolio to reduce firm-
specific risk and thereby reduce the overall portfolio risk. Firm-specific risk, also often referred to as 
unsystematic risk, can be completely diversified away by adding extra assets, diversifying internationally 
or investing in different asset classes. Even though the investor has reduced her unsystematic risk through 
diversification her portfolio is still exposed to market or systematic risk such as interest risk, political risk, 
instability in the financial system etc. According to the capital asset pricing model an investor should be 
rewarded by taking on extra market risk (Sharpe, 1964). The market risk premium an investor achieves 
when taking on additional systematic risk is the overall return of the market minus the risk-free rate times 
the market beta of the stock relevant for the investment. On the other hand, investors do not get awarded 
for taking on unsystematic risk since that risk can be diversified away. Usually a market index is used as a 
proxy for the market performance. Chen, Roll & Ross (1986) use two indices of the New York Stock 
Exchange to represent the market performance in their empirical research of forces that affect stock 
returns. One of the most commonly used indices is the S&P 500 that represents the American stock market 
and the index contains 500 companies that should be representative for the overall market. Since this 
study focuses on four Swedish stocks the Stockholm OMX 30 index is used as a proxy for the market 
performance in Sweden.  
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2.4.5 A PROXY FOR THE RISK-FREE RATE 
 
FIGURE 2.9 
The risk-free interest rate is defined as the interest rate that can be achieved without exposing the invested 
funds to any risk. According to basic microeconomic theory, the opportunity cost for an investment is the 
best alternative use of funds (Perloff, 2011). That means that when an investment decision is being made 
one has to compare the expected returns of the investment to the second best investment. An opportunity 
cost can be seen as a foregone opportunity if the funds are used to finance another investment and a 
foregone opportunity has to be viewed as an economic cost even though it might not be considered as a 
cost in the books. When an investor evaluates the expected returns of an investment or a business project 
she has to be able to compare its expected returns to a benchmark of some sort. If the expected return of a 
business project is lower than the return of a risk-free investment it would be irrational to undertake that 
investment based on microeconomic utility theory (Perloff, 2011). But if the expected return of an 
investment is higher than the risk-free rate it would be worth considering the investment, even when 
taking risk into account. The risk-free rate can be viewed as an opportunity cost since when the economy 
does poorly the financial risk of investing in risky assets increases and risk averse investors tend to put 
their money in the risk free asset. If the economy does well investors tend to put their money into risky 
assets. Chen, Roll & Ross (1986) use US Treasury Bills with a maturity of one month as a proxy for the 
risk-free rate in their model and they find a statistically significant impact on the returns of the stocks that 
they analyze. Since the Big Four have most of their operations in Sweden and the stocks used in the 
analysis are traded at the Stockholm OMX, Swedish Treasury Bills with a maturity of one month are used 
to represent the risk-free rate throughout this thesis. 
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2.4.6 TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 
 
FIGURE 2.10 
The term structure of interest rates reveals the relationship between short and long term interest rates. To 
be more precise the term structure of interest is the relationship between interest rates and their 
maturities. This connection is usually summarized by practitioners using a yield curve. When long term 
rates are higher than short term rates, the term structure is upward sloping and when short-term rates are 
higher than long-term rates it is downward sloping. The yield curve is a main tool in fixed income trading 
because it reflects believes about future short-term rates. Investors can then use it as a benchmark for their 
own expectations of future interest rates. The shape of the term structure is composed by three basic 
components. The first one is the real rate of interest investors require for forgoing the use of their money. 
The second component is prospects of future inflation. An investor thinking of lending money for a longer 
period of time will have to consider the risk that inflation will reduce the value of the money and 
therefore demand compensation for this. Accordingly, expectations that inflation will be high in the future 
will put pressure on long-term interest rates which will tend to be higher than short-term interest rates. 
The third component comes from interest rate risk faced by bond holders. Investors will recognize the risk 
and demand compensation due to higher interest rate risk for long term bonds than for short term bonds.  
Bodie et al. (2011) discuss the way yield curves are interpreted by many market professionals as warning 
signals of impending rate increases. They state that this could be used as a good predictor of the business 
cycle as a whole. The idea has its foundation in the fact that long-term rates tend to rise in anticipation of 
an expansion in the economy. The investor can then interpret a steep upward sloping yield curve as a 
signal telling that the probability of a recession in the next year is low, at least in contrast to the scenario 
when investors observe a steep downward sloping yield curve. A scenario indicating a downward 
sloping yield curve might be associated with an impending recession.  
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2.4.7 EXCHANGE RATE 
 
FIGURE 2.11 
Daily changes in the exchange rate between the Swedish Krona and Euro are included as an explanatory 
variable in the empirical analysis of this thesis. The exchange rate is an important factor as it affects the 
competitiveness of the industry within the respective countries. An appreciation of the Swedish Krona 
relative to the Euro will cause problems for Swedish producers that must compete with producers in the 
Euro zone. Since their products become relatively more expensive the consequence is a loss of sales for 
Swedish exporters. Such a downgrade in sales will cause concern not only for those particular exporters 
but even for their subcontractors. Bodie et al. (2011) talk about the complications for the Japanese 
economy associated with the financial crisis of 2008. The Japanese yen was by many investors viewed as a 
safe haven during this tumbling period. The sharp appreciation of the Japanese Yen caused the Nikkei 
stock market index to fall by 50% even before the financial crisis had been fully reflected in global stock 
prices. The importance of the strength of the Swedish krona for the domestic economy as a whole makes it 
an obvious factor to include in the analysis of stock returns for the four Swedish banks.   
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This section covers the working process in which the analysis of this thesis has been established. The analysis is based 
on econometric theory which is a very wide topic and therefore the focus of this section is on the econometric 
methodology used especially for this analysis.  
3.1 DATA 
Data used in this thesis is daily time series data running from 21st of March 2005 to 5th of April 2012. The 
analysis is divided into three sections. One section covers the whole period and consists of 1775 daily 
observations. The two remaining data sections were created by dividing the whole period into two parts. 
One section includes daily data before the Lehman Brothers crash and one section includes daily data 
after the Lehman Brothers crash. The sample collected before the crash includes 877 observations and the 
sample collected after the crash includes 898 observations. The two samples consist of an almost 
equivalent amount of observations. This makes it relevant to compare the results from the first period to 
the second period. The data is sorted to only consist of days when our dependent variables are traded on 
the Swedish stock market.  
Data for this thesis has been collected using the database Datastream available at the Gothenburg 
University library. Datastream is a database provided by the Thomson Reuters Group. Datastream 
provides current and historical time series data on stocks, stocks indices, commodities, bonds, futures, 
options, interest rates, derivatives and other economic data.  
A potential criticism to our data is that it has not been adjusted for stock splits or inverse stock splits that 
may have occurred during the period of interest, neither has it been adjusted for dividend pay-outs that 
affects stock returns on that particular date.   
The dependent variables in our analysis are stock returns calculated using formula 3:1, which is a 
standard method for calculating returns between adjacent periods 
   
         
    
      (3:1) 
where    is the return of asset i,    the price of the asset at time t and      the price of the asset at time t-1.  
There are other methods to calculate a change in a variable between two periods. For example it is 
possible to do the calculations by taking the natural logarithm of the value for the second period minus 
the natural logarithm of the value for the first period to get an approximate value of the change between 
the two periods. But since the way the returns are calculated by using formula 3:1 is more precise for 
larger changes, that method has been used throughout this analysis. 
The CDS that has been used is the iTraxx Europe index with a maturity of 3 years. As a market proxy the 
Stockholm OMX 30 Index has been used. Daily changes in the SEK/Euro exchange rates have been used as 
a foreign exchange rate. Swedish T-bills with a maturity of 1 month are used as a proxy for the risk free 
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rate and the Brent crude oil price in dollars per barrel is used as oil price. The term structure of interest 
rates is represented by a Swedish yield curve with a constant maturity of 1 year. Changes in the 
independent variables CDS-spreads, OMX 30 Index, SEK/Euro exchange rates, interest rates of Swedish T-
bills and term structure of interest rates have all been calculated in the same manner as the bank stock 
returns. The changes in oil price have been calculated differently since the model aims to capture the 
effect that unanticipated changes in the price of oil has on the returns of the bank stocks. This is done by 
using an autoregressive model of order one 
                                   (3:2) 
where            is the oil price at time t,    a constant,   a sensitivity measure,              the oil price at 
time t-1 and    a random error term that represents the unanticipated change in the price of oil. Since the 
aim of the model is to capture the causal effect of unanticipated changes in oil price, the error term     is 
the factor that gets to represent the oil price in the model used in this thesis.  
The Amihud measure has been calculated by using the formula presented in section 2.4.2. But since the 
focus lies on macroeconomic factors and not firm specific factors, illiquidity for the Swedish stock market 
is used instead of illiquidity for particular stocks. This market illiquidity has been calculated by using the 
absolute returns of the OMX 30 index and the total OMX 30 turnover. These values have then been used 
to calculate the Amihud measure on a daily basis. Since it is standard to multiply the received value for 
Amuhud’s measure by one million it has also been done.  
All statistical analyses are carried out using STATA. STATA is a statistical software developed by 
StataCorp and are used for statistical analysis, graphics and custom programming.  
3.2 ECONOMETRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.2.1 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Wooldridge (2009) describes econometrics as a method based upon the development of statistical 
methods for estimating economic relationships, testing economic theories and evaluating and 
implementing policies in businesses and governments.  Econometrics can for example be used to study 
the effect of governmental policies on GDP or inflation. Researchers can then catch a causal relationship 
between an independent variable used to describe changes in a dependent variable. The application of the 
econometrical science in this thesis is to investigate how some macroeconomic variables affect stock 
returns for four Swedish banks. It is natural that econometricians have borrowed techniques from 
mathematical statisticians and applied it on economic theory. One of these techniques is the method of 
multiple and simple regression used as the mainstay in both of these sciences.  
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3.2.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The econometrical analysis of this thesis has its foundation in the theory of simple and multiple 
regressions.  A simple regression describes the effect of one x variable, also known as an independent 
variable, on the dependent variable y. The dependent variable is throughout this paper represented by 
daily stock returns of one of the four Swedish banks, analyzed in this paper. A simple regression equation 
is  
                (3:3) 
In the equation    is a constant and    is a slope parameter between y and x. The main interest of the 
analysis is to capture the effect a change in the x variable has on the dependent variable y holding the 
factors in   fixed. The variable   in the equation represents an error term and includes all factors that 
affect y except   . One application of a simple regression model in this thesis could for example be to test 
how changes in CDS-spreads affect stock returns. CDS-spreads are then used as the only explanatory 
variable represented by the   -variable in equation (3:3). Of course changes in CDS-spreads are not the 
only factor that affects changes in stock returns for the bank stocks. To make the analysis more accurate it 
is straightforward to include more explanatory variables. The equation is then developed into a multiple 
regression. The equation is defined as 
                            (3:4) 
The interpretation of the beta values are the same as it is for the simple regression model with the only 
difference that when the effect of a change in one variable is estimated ceteris paribus is assumed, that 
means, holding all other variables constant. The multiple regression model is used in this thesis to capture 
and analyze effects of more macroeconomic factors that may affect stock returns for the “Big four”. 
Factors previously included in the error term are instead included as explanatory variables in the original 
model. It would be impossible to include every variable affecting stock returns in one single model and 
some factors are therefore still included in the error term u. Because the objective of this analysis is to 
focus on macroeconomic factors it is not unrealistic to assume that corporate specific factors are included 
in the error term. Examples of such factors are a range of financial ratios, insider trading, and corporate 
structure etcetera. Other reasons why results may differ between banks are differences in such corporate 
structures and the individual risk factors that banks are exposed to.  
This subsection has established the main ingredients for the econometrical analysis used in this thesis. The 
next subsections explain how these estimates are calculated. Several tests for violation of assumptions 
crucial for the use of such estimation methods are described and discussed together with methods to 
adjust for such problems.  
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Table: 3:1 
3.2.3 ESTIMATING THE MODEL 
 
FIGURE 3.1 
In the previous subsection the basics of multiple regression and simple regression were discussed. One 
way of doing this is to use a method referred to as OLS (Ordinary Least Squares). The ordinary least 
square estimate is obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. The mathematical derivation of 
the estimates is not relevant for the understanding of this thesis. For this purpose, it is more important to 
understand the basic interpretation of the OLS-estimation process. This is why a more general explanation 
of OLS is described in this subsection.  
As mentioned above OLS minimize the sum of squared residuals. A residual can be thought of as the 
difference between the actual value in table (3:1) and the estimated line. OLS estimates a straight line as 
table (3:1) indicates. The estimation process estimates values on the Y-variable based on values of the X-
variables so that the sum of squared differences (sum of squared residuals) between the predicted line 
and the actual values is as small as possible. Actual values are represented by the actual stock returns for 
each bank that is subject to analysis. The predicted line is stock returns estimated using the seven 
economic factors in focus for this thesis. The residuals can be thought of as the error term described in 
subsection 3.2.2. If actual values are above the regression line OLS underestimates the actual value of 
stock returns and if actual values are below the regression line OLS overestimates stock returns. It is 
crucial to understand that although all variables under analysis are measured over time, time is not the 
dependent variable in this case. The X-variable represents economic macro factors and the regression line 
is calculated based on changes in those factors rather than changes over time. This does not exclude the 
fact that time may affect returns, but this analysis does not measure the causal effect of time on stock 
returns.   
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3.2.4 HOW TO INTERPRET THE RESULTS  
Much of the interpretation in econometrics is based on hypothesis testing. One such test is the t-statistic 
test about the significance of a single parameter in the model. The hypothesis test is built upon the H0-
hypothesis that the coefficient of     . The alternative hypothesis, generally referred to as H1, is that the 
coefficient of    is not equal to zero. That means that the analysed factor does affect the dependent 
variable. The choice of whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis includes a rejection rule based on a 
chosen significance level. The significance level used in this type of tests is represented as the probability 
of a “Type 1 Error”. The type 1 error is to reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact true. One can then 
interpret the significance level as the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact true. In 
finance it is conventional to use a significance level of 5%. When deciding whether to reject the null 
hypothesis or not one has to compare the significance level to some appropriate value. One such value is 
called the P-value and will be reported along with all regression printouts throughout this thesis. It is 
therefore fundamental to understand the meaning of the P-value to fully understand these printouts. P-
values are obtained by first calculating a value called t-value. The P-value is a probability value based on 
the calculated t-value. A more detailed explanation is not necessary for the general understanding of this 
thesis. For a more detailed explanation on how to calculate these values please see Wooldridge (2009). For 
interpretation purposes it is crucial that the standard errors are correctly calculated. Standard errors are 
obtained from the variance of the regression. Incorrectly calculated standard errors cause problems for the 
interpretation of a single parameter. Such problems may for example be heteroskedasticity. The P-value is 
the smallest significance level at which the null hypothesis can be rejected. Equivalently it is the largest 
significance level at which the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. To further clarify, if a variable receive a 
P-value equal to 0.10 (10%), one can reject the null hypothesis at 10% significance level, but not at 5%. The 
analyzed variable can then not be declared significant on 5%. Further, a P-value equal to 0.001 (0.1%) can 
reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance level. The variable would then be declared significant at 5% 
significance level.  
3.2.5 MODELING PROBLEMS 
OMITTED VARIABLE BIAS 
If first estimating the simple regression model using only CDS-spreads as the explanatory variable, one 
obvious problem is that other relevant factors that may also affect stock returns are not controlled for. The 
resulting problem that will occur is that the coefficient on CDS-spreads will suffer from omitted variable 
bias. If it will be upward or downward bias depends partly on the correlation between the omitted 
variable and the CDS-spreads and the effect the omitted variable has on the explanatory variable. For 
example, omitting the OMX 30-index might cause the coefficient on CDS-spreads to be downward biased. 
This comes from the fact that when CDS-spreads go up, returns on the OMX 30-index tend to go down. 
CDS-spreads and OMX 30-index returns are so to speak negatively correlated. Then, if positive returns on 
the OMX 30-index have a positive effect on stock returns this causes CDS-spreads to be negatively biased 
when omitting returns on the OMX 30-index from the regression. Not only does the sign of the bias cause 
concerns in econometric work, but also the size of the bias. Small values of the bias do not generally cause 
very much problems. Large values of the bias cause much more concern and then the model is 
Macroeconomic Forces and Their Effects   
 on the Swedish Banking Sector  Johansson Prakt & Larsson 
  
   
27 | P a g e  
 
underspecified. A model with CDS-spreads as the only explanatory variable is clearly underspecified. 
Including six more variables in the model makes the results less likely to be biased due to omitted 
variables. The choice of explanatory variables in this model is a result of economic reasoning based on 
academic reports and financial theory. The main focus is to analyze what causes stock returns to move on 
a daily basis and it is therefore necessary to restrict the model in some way. A crucial assumption when 
estimating models using OLS is that the error term has an expected value equal to zero given any values 
on the explanatory variables. It is equivalent to saying that all explanatory variables are uncorrelated with 
the error term. This assumption is also of great importance when testing for autocorrelation. Details 
regarding this will be covered in a separate subsection.  
MULTICOLLINEARITY  
Another problem that may occur when estimating multiple regressions is multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variables in the model. One obvious example of multicollinearity is when using both dollar 
and dollar in thousands as explanatory variables. The correlation between these two variables will 
without any exception equal one. Some degree of correlation between the explanatory variables causes no 
problems and can without serious consequences be ignored. Thus, what would cause problem is the case 
of perfect correlation between any of the explanatory variables. The case of no perfect correlation is 
necessary when estimating beta values using OLS.  
It is quite straightforward to test for multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. In the appendix 
there are three correlation matrices that indicate the correlation between the explanatory models subject 
for this thesis. No perfect correlation or any correlation close to perfect is found, though some correlation 
is found. To adjust for multicollinearity one can exclude one variable in the regression and eliminate the 
problem. This may on the other hand cause the model to suffer from omitted variable bias discussed in 
the previous subsection. Another way of managing such problem is to obtain more observations in the 
regression or simply ignore the problem. For this thesis the most appropriate method is to ignore the 
problem since no high correlation between any of the explanatory variables was found (Appendix).  
HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
In subsection 3.2.4 the importance of correctly calculated standard errors was elucidated. One 
fundamental assumption on which the calculation of t-values is based on is the homoscedasticity 
assumption. In econometrics homoscedasticity means that the errors in a regression model have constant 
variance conditional on the explanatory variables. A violation of this assumption causes the model to 
suffer from heteroskedasticity. Since OLS standard errors are based directly on the variances of the model, 
an implication of heteroskedasticity is that these standard errors are no longer valid when estimating t-
values and P-values of the model. Unfortunately this problem cannot be solved using large sample sizes. 
Fortunately other adjustments for heteroskedasticity exist and one such method is discussed in this thesis.  
To decide whether to adjust for heteroskedasticity or not one must decide if the heteroskedasticity is a 
problem for the particular model. It is sometimes suggested that tests for misspecifications of the model, 
and adjustments for such misspecifications should be done before testing for heteroskedasticity. Examples 
of such misspecifications might be to include a variable in level-form instead of log-form or omitting the 
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square of any variable that might be significant. For the purpose of this thesis such tests have not been 
considered appropriate. The main objective of this thesis is to analyze differences between four dependent 
variables. Re-specifying a particular model based on each dependent variable would make the 
comparison between the four banks difficult to interpret and the purpose of this paper would not be 
fulfilled.  
It is then straightforward to test for heteroskedasticity. There are several different tests that can be 
performed to conclude that heteroskedasticity is present in the sample. One well-known test for 
heteroskedasticity is the Breush-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test that can be performed automatically when 
using a statistical software package such as STATA that is used in this analysis (Manual, STATA 12). 
When performing this test the null hypothesis of equal error variances is being tested against the 
hypothesis that there is heteroskedasticity in the sample. This is done by first running a regression on the 
model for which heteroskedasticity shall be tested for. In the second step the predicted values and the 
square of the residuals have to be calculated and the residuals are rescaled by giving them means of one. 
The change in scale is done mainly to enable the calculation of the test-statistic. After the rescaling the 
predicted values are regressed on the rescaled squared residuals and the chi-square test-statistic is 
calculated. The null is rejected for large chi-square values, which means that there is heteroskedasticity 
present in the sample. If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis heteroskedasticity is not a problem. 
AUTOCORRELATION 
The time-series data for stocks and other assets used throughout this study has been reported on a daily 
basis over the whole period of investigation. When a stock is being traded on a stock exchange its price 
fluctuates constantly and the price at the end of the trading day is the price at which the stock is being 
traded at in the beginning of the next. Intuitively, yesterday’s stock price affects at which price level the 
stock is being traded for today and at which price level it will be traded for in the future. The question is 
only how large this effect is and if it could be a problem. In econometrics and statistics this phenomenon is 
called autocorrelation or serial correlation which means that there is correlation between the error terms 
between two adjacent periods in time. The first-order autocorrelation between two different time periods 
has the following formula  
                 (3:5) 
where    is the error term at time t,   the slope coefficient,      the error term at time t-1 and    a random 
error term for the first-order autocorrelation formula. Autocorrelation is a common feature when time-
series data is being used in an econometrical analysis. One issue that might occur when autocorrelation is 
present is that OLS will not be the best estimation method and the true variance will be underestimated. 
This in turn leads to t-values that will overestimate the statistical significance when performing statistical 
tests and the danger with this is that it can lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis even though it is in 
fact true. Just as for heteroskedasticity, there are numerous ways to test for autocorrelation. The method 
that is used in this analysis is the Durbin-Watson Alternative Test for Autocorrelation performed 
automatically in STATA (Manual, STATA 12). In the Durbin-Watson alternative test the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation is tested against the alternative hypothesis that first-order autocorrelation is present. 
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The null hypothesis is rejected for large values of the chi-square test-statistic which suggests that there is 
autocorrelation. For small values of the test-statistic the null is not rejected which states that serial 
correlation not is an issue. 
3.2.6 ADJUSTMENTS TO MODELING PROBLEMS 
The data sets for the whole period 2005-2012, the period before the Lehman Brothers crash and the period 
after the crash have all been tested for multicollinearity by constructing correlation matrices. These 
matrices are presented in the appendix table A.27-A.29. The conclusion is that even though some 
correlation between certain variables exists, no high degree of multicollinearity is present in any of the 
three periods and therefore multicollinearity is not an issue that has been corrected for. 
The data sets for the three periods have all been tested for heteroskedasticity by using the Breush-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and for autocorrelation by using the Durbin-Watson Alternative Test for 
autocorrelation. These tests are described in more detail in previous sections. The results from these tests 
are presented in the appendix. To adjust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation lagged Newey-West 
estimators and Newey-West standard errors have been used. These adjustments are automatically 
calculated by STATA (Manual, STATA 12). In those cases where only heteroskedasticity and not 
autocorrelation has been present Newey-West estimators without lags have been used to adjust for it. 
When both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity have been present Newey-West estimators with one lag 
have been used. Tables and results are presented in more detail in the appendix. 
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4. RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
In this section empirical results are presented and analyzed. The analysis is based on what have been discussed in the 
theory section. Results presented are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and when indicated also adjusted for 
autocorrelation. Newey-West standard errors are used in all of the following regressions. For the joint-significance  
test a p-value is reported.  
SWEDBANK 
 
 
 Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
 
Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
 
Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
Variables                     
CDS -0.026 0.010 0.012  -0.033 0.024 0.158  -0.028 0.012 0.022 
OMX 30 Index 1.113 0.043 0.000  1.397 0.079 0.000  1.283 0.051 0.000 
SEK/Euro Exchange rate -0.084 0.142 0.554  -0.177 0.197 0.369  -0.219 0.164 0.180 
Swedish T-Bills 0.005 0.013 0.671  0.005 0.004 0.144  0.005 0.004 0.133 
Yield Curve 0.032 0.037 0.384  0.005 0.005 0.299  0.007 0.005 0.260 
Amihud Measure 16.54 15.43 0.284  -12.07 11.76 0.305  -2.57 8.940 0.774 
Oil price 0.000 0.000 0.193  0.001 0.001 0.309  0.001 0.000 0.060 
 
Statistics  Statistics  Statistics 
Adjusted 
for autocorrelation Yes     
 
No     
 
No     
Joint Significance  
(F-test) 0.000     
 
0.000     
 
0.000     
TABLE 4.1 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis Swedbank was a bank that exposed themselves more than others to the 
Baltic States. Equivalent with this, Swedbank’s stock returns reveal a high correlation with variations in 
CDS-spreads. Before the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008, variations in CDS-spreads had a significant 
negative effect on Swedbank’s stock returns even at 2% significance level. The value of the coefficient is 
negative even after the crash and the coefficient magnitude remains at an equivalent level. It is also 
interesting that for the whole periods it turns out to have a very significant effect on stock returns. Thus, 
after the crash variations in CDS-spreads are less significant and can only be accepted at a 16% 
significance level.  An increase in CDS-spreads is equivalent with higher beliefs of counterparty defaults 
within the European Union. An increase in beliefs of counterparty default then has a negative effect on 
stock returns for Swedbank. For the whole period variations in CDS-spreads are clearly significant even at 
3%, which is particularly interesting because this period includes 1775 observations. Further, OMX 30 is 
significant for all periods which are quite what could be expected as Swedbank is included in this index.  
The coefficient on the SEK to Euro rate for all periods under investigation reveals an interesting 
relationship. An appreciation of the Euro relative to the SEK leads to an increase in the SEK/Euro rate. 
From the perspective of a Swedish export oriented company an appreciation of the Euro, which is 
equivalent with a depreciation of the SEK would be favorable for the company’s sales due to the fact that 
Before Crash After Crash Whole Period 
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their products would be relatively cheaper compared to their foreign competitors. On the other hand 
companies that depend on input factors bought on the international market could be harmed by a weaker 
Swedish currency. Factors mentioned above could in an efficient market be directly reflected in the stock 
price due to changed beliefs of future cash flows. For Swedbank, a weaker Swedish currency has a 
negative effect on stock returns but the effect only reveals some significance for the whole period. While 
the CDS gets less significant after the crash the Swedish T-Bill variable gets more significant. For the 
whole period daily variation in T-Bills indicates a P-value of 13.3%. The other interest rate variable, the 
yield curve, is not particularly significant for any period. However, it tends to be more significant after the 
crash.  Amihud’s measure as a proxy for industrial production is not significant for any of the investigated 
periods. Daily changes in oil price only indicate some significance when it is analyzed for the entire 
period.  
SEB 
 
 
 Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
 
Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
 
Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
Variables                     
CDS -0.023 0.009 0.007  0.010 0.022 0.656  -0.011 0.011 0.291 
OMX 30 Index 1.231 0.041 0.000  1.610 0.079 0.000  1.470 0.052 0.000 
SEK/Euro Exchange rate -0.234 0.141 0.097  -0.198 0.204 0.333  -0.283 0.172 0.099 
Swedish T-Bills -0.006 0.013 0.633  -0.001 0.003 0.584  -0.001 0.003 0.636 
Yield Curve 0.0396 0.036 0.276  -0.001 0.002 0.813  -0.003 0.003 0.896 
Amihud Measure 34.21 12.528 0.006  -1.786 11.373 0.875  5.174 8.657 0.550 
Oil price -0.000 0.000 0.112  0.001 0.000 0.003  -0.000 0.000 0.847 
 
Statistics  Statistics  Statistics 
Adjusted 
for autocorrelation No     
 
Yes     
 
Yes     
Joint Significance  
(F-test) 0.000     
 
0.000     
 
0.000     
TABLE 4.2 
One obvious difference between Swedbank and SEB is the significance of Amihud’s measure before the 
crash. It is clearly significant before the crash with a P-value equal to 0.006 but not significant at all the 
period after. Amihud’s measure is an illiquidity measure which in this analysis measures illiquidity on 
the OMX 30-index. The positive sign on the coefficient on Amihud’s measure tells that investors awarded 
the SEB stock with some kind of market illiquidity premium before the crash but not after. The stock 
increased drastically in value before the crash but decreased even more after the crash. According to this, 
a possible explanation is that investors had strong beliefs and confidence in the SEB-stock before the crash 
but as weaknesses in SEB’s strategy were clearly revealed during the crisis investors may have lost their 
confidence for the stock and by that, the award for market illiquidity disappeared. Variation in OMX 30 
index is significant for SEB as well which is not very surprising. Another variable that is significant at 10% 
before the crisis but not after is the SEK/Euro exchange rate. One possible explanation is that SEB after the 
Before Crash After Crash Whole Period 
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crash re-allocated some of their international risk exposure and thereby lost some dependency on the 
exchange rate to Euro. Variations in Swedish T-Bills show no significant results for any of the three 
periods.  Although, the yield curve is not significant for any period it shows some tendency to be even 
less significant after the crash than before. Oil price becomes more significant after the Lehman Brothers 
crash although it is not significant for the whole period and the economic significance is very low. When it 
comes to the proxy for default risk, spreads on Credit Default Swaps are extremely significant before the 
Lehman Brothers crash but not significant at all the period after. There can be various reasons to this, but 
a potential explanation is the way SEB exposed themselves to risk before and after the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers. The comparison between SEB and Swedbank is obvious in this case as they both, before 
the crash, focused a lot on expanding their activities in the Baltic States.  
NORDEA 
 
 
 Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
 
Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
 
Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
Variables                     
CDS -0.003 0.007 0.643  -0.001 0.015 0.958  -0.001 0.008 0.891 
OMX 30 Index 1.036 0.034 0.000  1.294 0.054 0.000  1.213 0.035 0.000 
SEK/Euro Exchange rate 0.030 0.108 0.779  -0.191 0.110 0.083  -0.237 0.089 0.007 
Swedish T-Bills -0.005 0.011 0.634  -0.000 0.001 0.725  -0.000 0.001 0.712 
Yield Curve 0.027 0.029 0.352  -0.003 0.001 0.021  -0.003 0.002 0.043 
Amihud Measure 29.28 9.932 0.003  13.70 6.755 0.043  14.80 5.402 0.006 
Oil price -0.000 0.000 0.189  -0.000 0.000 0.925  -0.000 0.000 0.407 
 
Statistics  Statistics  Statistics 
Adjusted 
for autocorrelation No     
 
Yes     
 
No     
Joint Significance  
(F-test) 0.000     
 
0.000     
 
0.000     
TABLE 4.3 
As for both Swedbank and SEB the performance of the OMX 30 index has a highly significant effect on the 
stock returns of Nordea in all periods. This is no surprise since individual stock returns usually have some 
degree of correlation with the performance of the overall stock market, both internationally and on 
domestic stock markets. In the period before the crash the SEK to Euro exchange rate has no significant 
effect on the stock returns of Nordea. This drastically changes the period after as the table indicates a P-
value equal to 0.083. Although it is not significant at the standard significance level used in financial 
economics of 5%, the change is notable. For the whole period it is also significant at 1% significance level 
with a negative sign on the coefficient. A depreciation of the Swedish currency therefore has a negative 
effect on Nordea’s stock returns. This might be because of higher borrowing costs when borrowing in 
Euro. Investors can then interpret this as a negative factor on future revenues with a resulting decline in 
stock price. Compared to Swedbank and SEB it is clear that Nordea is very different when it comes to the 
statistical significance of Credit Default Swap-spreads. Variations in CDS-spreads show no significant 
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result explaining returns on the Nordea stock. However, it follows the same pattern as it gets even less 
significant after the Lehman crash. Interesting is the highly significant effect an increase in yield curve has 
on Nordea’s stock returns after the crash.  With a P-value corresponding to 0.021 and a negative sign on 
the coefficient this reveals a negative relationship between stock returns and yield curve. As a main tool in 
fixed income trading the yield curve reveals market beliefs about future short term interest rates. In times 
of economic growth the yield curve tends to be upward sloping as long term rates are higher than short 
term rates. The yield curve can be used to predict the probability of a future recession. In such scenario a 
downward sloping yield curve is a sign of increased probability of a future recession. Then short term 
rates are higher than long term rates. As the table above indicates, a positive change in yield curve makes 
the yield curve more upward sloping and causes the Nordea stock price to decline. This is contradictory 
to the theory just described as the yield curve functioning as a predictor of economic recession. The period 
from just before the Lehman Brothers crash to the end of the investigated period has to most part been 
characterized by problems on financial markets. In times when the economic environment is uncertain 
investors abandon more risky assets such as stocks and search for non-risk, or at least less risky assets 
such as treasury bills. This is referred to as a flight-to-quality. Swedish treasury bills are one asset that is 
considered as quality by investors. High demand on Swedish T-Bills put downward pressure on short 
term interest rates leading to an upward sloping yield curve. If investors choose T-Bills before stocks the 
increased demand for T-Bills will be reflected in a decreased demand for stocks resulting in a price 
decline. If assuming that long-term rates stayed at equivalent levels as this happened, it can explain why a 
positive change in yield curve had a negative effect on stock returns for Nordea as investors chose risk-
free investments before stocks. Amihud’s measure is included as a proxy variable for industrial 
production, or more precise it is a proxy variable for market illiquidity, and is highly significant when 
explaining changes in Nordea stock returns.  Amihud (2002), tests whether market illiquidity positively 
affects stock excess returns, which is so to speak the stock return in excess of Treasury bill rates.  He 
suggests that if investors anticipate higher market illiquidity they will tend to price stocks so that they 
generate higher returns. Basically this suggests that stock returns include a premium for market 
illiquidity. In this thesis one single measure of Amihud is used on all four bank stocks and is calculated on 
the OMX 30 index. Consequently, the measure can be interpreted as an illiquidity measure for the market 
on which Nordea is traded and investors trading on this market positively award the Nordea stock for 
this market illiquidity. Whether this is because Nordea has a market beta close to one indicating co-
movement between the OMX 30 index and the stock itself or that the market simply awards Nordea more 
than others for market illiquidity is ambiguous.  Another possible explanation is that in times when 
overall market illiquidity is higher, the demand increases for more liquid assets. In general stocks of larger 
corporations are more liquid than stock of smaller corporations. Since Nordea, as described in the theory 
section is the largest bank of these four, it is possible that the size of Nordea has a positive effect on the 
Nordea stock liquidity. This makes the liquidity risk associated with the Nordea stock lower than for 
other stocks that suffer from lower liquidity. It is then possible that when the overall stock market 
illiquidity increases, the demand for more liquid stocks rises and thereby the demand for the Nordea 
stock goes up. This puts an upward pressure on the stock price.  Oil price is not significant for any of the 
three periods.   
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HANDELSBANKEN 
 
 
 Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
 
Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
 
Value 
Std. 
error p-value 
Variables                     
CDS -0.009 0.008 0.229  0.021 0.014 0.122  0.005 0.008 0.510 
OMX 30 Index 0.913 0.036 0.000  1.108 0.044 0.000  1.032 0.032 0.000 
SEK/Euro Exchange rate 0.022 0.121 0.856  -0.295 0.129 0.023  -0.279 0.105 0.008 
Swedish T-Bills 0.006 0.099 0.559  0.001 0.001 0.039  0.001 0.001 0.052 
Yield Curve 0.011 0.030 0.707  -0.020 0.002 0.415  -0.002 0.003 0.485 
Amihud Measure 17.268 9.187 0.061  7.961 7.303 0.276  10.502 5.594 0.061 
Oil price 0.000 0.000 0.864  0.000 0.001 0.650  0.000 0.000 0.368 
 
Statistics  Statistics  Statistics 
Adjusted 
for autocorrelation No     
 
No     
 
Yes     
Joint Significance  
(F-test) 0.000     
 
0.000     
 
0.000     
TABLE 4.4 
Contrary to the other three banks Handelsbanken reveals a different pattern when it comes to the 
significance of changes in CDS-spreads before and after the crisis. Although the CDS is not even 
significant at 10% significance level it gets more significant after the crisis. Also the SEK/Euro exchange 
rate is much more significant after the default of Lehman Brothers indicated by a P-value equal to 0.023. 
Also changes in the Swedish T-Bill rate reveal the same pattern. Amihud’s measure is significant at 6% 
significance level before the crisis but not after. It is unquestionable that Handelsbanken is in some ways 
different from the others. When it comes to risk exposure Handelsbanken has not exposed themselves to 
the Baltic States in the same way as SEB and Swedbank. The positive value on the coefficient on CDS after 
the crash should not be taken too seriously as its confidence interval (appendix) covers positive as well as 
negative values. Maybe the most interesting difference between data covering the period before the crash 
and data after the crash is the change in significance of the T-bill rate. As mentioned earlier in this thesis 
Handelsbanken did not suffer as much losses as other banks from the financial crisis of 2008. Actually 
Handelsbanken lent money to the Swedish State during these times. Earlier in this chapter a scenario 
referred to as flight-to-quality was described. It emphasizes investors risk aversion and willingness to 
invest in quality assets in times of economic uncertainty. The positive sign even after looking at the 
confidence interval (appendix) reveals that Handelsbanken’s stock returns was positively correlated with 
changes in the Swedish T-Bill rate. A rise in the T-Bill rate is correlated by a rise in stock returns. This 
gives rise to a possible explanation that after the crash of Lehman Brothers, Handelsbanken was one stock 
which investors considered as a possible substitute to the T-Bill when returning to the stock market. 
Although the stock was definitely harmed by the tough financial climate, the market did not punish the 
stock to the same extent as it harmed other banks. One reason could be that investors viewed the stock as 
a quality asset at least comparable to other Swedish bank stocks.  
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5. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
With a pronounced purpose to examine the effect of some macroeconomic factors on four Swedish bank 
stocks, the conclusion is much what could be expected in the sense that macroeconomic factors do affect 
stock returns. Additionally interesting are the changes in significance levels over the two focus periods on 
which most emphasize have been put.  Differences also exist between the different banks both in respect 
to the significance level and the sign and magnitude of the coefficients. Some possible explanations for 
this were discussed in the analysis section. It is obvious that the common view of the “Big Four” as one 
entity is no longer valid because the differences between them cannot be ignored. SEB and Swedbank 
were clearly more affected by changes in CDS-spreads than for instance Handelsbanken, although 
Swedbank’s and SEB’s dependence of CDS-spreads decreased after the default of Lehman Brothers. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that the effect on Swedbank still had some significance after the crash 
whereas the effect on SEB after the crash was almost none. It seems like presence in the Baltic States is a 
common factor for the banks that were affected most by changes in CDS-spreads. If this simply can be 
derived from their operations in these regions or if it is connected to an overall view on risk by the banks 
is ambiguous. If the former is true it would be a good explanation to why the significance of CDS-spreads 
decreased after the crash as these banks later on emphasized more on having solid finances.  
A bank which distinguished itself from the others was Handelsbanken. The Swedish T-bill rate turned out 
to be significant for Handelsbanken after the crash but not before. The significance of Swedish T-Bills 
increased drastically after the crash due to a flight-to-quality. Compared to the other banks 
Handelsbanken was the only bank for which changes in T-Bill rates were significant with a positive sign 
on the coefficient. Adding the fact that CDS-spreads did not have a significant effect on Handelsbanken 
leads to the conclusion that the stock was considered by investors as less risky than the others. Of course 
the stock was affected by the overall market which is further proved by its significant dependency on the 
OMX 30 index. Although it recovered some time after the worst period and today trades at levels 
equivalent before the sub-prime crisis and the Lehman Brothers crash. The same thing cannot be said 
about Swedbank or SEB. A measure of systematic risk which is commonly used in finance and portfolio 
management is the market beta of a stock. A stock with a high market beta is more affected by market 
volatility than stocks with a low market beta. A value of one indicates perfect correlation with the market. 
According to the tables in the previous section it is obvious that the market beta1 is significant at 1% 
significance level for all banks in all periods. What can be noted is that the value is higher for all banks 
after the crash than before. This conducts the conclusion that all stocks are more dependent on the overall 
market performance after the crash than they were before. The systematic risk, even referred to as the 
market risk, differs across different banks. This further strengthens the previous discussion in this section 
about clear differences between the banks. According to this measure the bank with the highest market 
risk is SEB with a beta value equal to 1.610 after the crash, followed by Swedbank, Nordea and 
Handelsbanken. Again, Handelsbanken turns out to be the least risky stock of these four.  
                                                          
1 Market beta is represented by the coefficient on OMX 30-index which is presented in tables in section 5 “Results & Analysis” 
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The SEK/Euro-rate varies in significance level between banks and periods. The exchange rate is not of 
specific interest to explain stock movements for Swedbank, but it shows some interesting patterns for the 
other three banks. It is significant at 10% for SEB the whole period and the period before the crash but not 
the period after. The results for Nordea differ in the sense that the SEK/Euro variable is not significant at 
all the period before the crash but significant at 10% the period after and even at 1% when looking at the 
whole period. Similar results as those for Nordea are presented for SEB with no significance before the 
crash but significance at 3% level after the crash and at 1% level for the whole period.  All results that have 
been referred to as significant at any level reveal a negative correlation between increased SEK/Euro-rate 
and stock returns. That means a depreciation of the SEK causes stock returns to fall. The reason to why 
this happens is not determined in this thesis since it can have a number of possible explanations. One 
could be that as the Swedish currency depreciates it gets more expensive for Swedish banks to borrow 
money in Euro which negatively affects their future earnings. Another possible explanation is that when 
investors choose to invest their money outside of Sweden, downward pressure is added to both the stock 
price and the SEK due to decreased demand of investing in Sweden. Additionally, what is interesting is 
that Handelsbanken and Nordea show the same pattern when it comes to changes in significance levels 
before and after the crash, while SEB shows the opposite pattern. Differences between the banks are even 
here confirmed. It would not be unreasonable to believe that one reason for this might have something to 
do with SEB’s activities in Germany.  
To summarize, it is clear that banks certainly are affected by changes in the economic environment. This 
was concluded by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986). What has been concluded here is that it is possible to look 
at other proxies for macroeconomic development than the ones examined in their work. This has been 
made possible much due to the development of financial derivatives. One such derivative is a CDS which 
has been examined here. The empirical method used in this thesis is based on historical data and even 
though it consists of a substantial number of observations it should be mentioned that historical data 
cannot fully be used to predict the future. That historical data cannot at all times predict future events is 
proved by the differences in significance levels of many factors before and after the Crash of Lehman 
Brothers. Factors that are used in this thesis to describe stock variations are not generally what really 
cause stock prices to move. Important is what these factors actually represent. To create a model that more 
precisely describes a company’s returns requires a well performed analysis of the specific characteristics 
of that company as different characteristics affect how various companies react to different factors. The 
purpose of this thesis was to examine to what extent macroeconomic factors presented on a daily basis 
could be used to explain the individual performance of four bank stocks before and after the crash of 
Lehman Brothers. The empirical study clearly indicates that a clear correlation between macroeconomic 
factors and stock returns exists but also that large differences exist between different banks. A possible 
criticism to the results is that even though results are statistically significant, the values of the coefficients 
are sometimes very low which questions the economic significance of the results.  But more importantly, it 
points out important differences between the big four Swedish banks and questions the view of them as a 
single entity referred to as “The Big Four”.   
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PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
To deepen the understanding of what factors that cause stock prices to rise or fall, an interesting subject 
for further empirical research could be to capture the impact of firm-specific factors on the stock returns of 
these banks. This could preferably be undertaken by a more in-depth analysis of the characteristics of 
individual corporations through analyzing financial statements. By doing this kind of analysis it would be 
possible to determine the financial health of a bank in a way that could not be done through an 
econometrical analysis of macroeconomic factors. 
Another interesting matter would be to do the same test that was done in this thesis on smaller sized 
banks and global investment banks.  
  
Macroeconomic Forces and Their Effects   
 on the Swedish Banking Sector  Johansson Prakt & Larsson 
  
   
38 | P a g e  
 
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects. Journal of Financial 
Markets 5, pp. 31-56. 
Blanchard, O. & Gali, J., September 2007. The Macroeconomic Effect of Oil Shocks: Why are the 2000s so 
different from the 1970s?. National Bureau of Economic Research, pp. Cambridge, NBER Working Paper No. 
13368. 
Bodie, Z., Kane, A. & Marcus, A. J., 2011. Investments and Portfolio Management 9:th edition. New York: 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Chen, N.-F., Roll, R. & Ross, S. A., 1986. Economic Forces and The Stock Market. The Journal of Business, 59, 
pp. 383-403. 
Connor, G. & Korajczyk, R., 1993. A Test for the Number of Factors in an Approximate Factor Model. 
Journal of Finance 48, pp. 1263-1291. 
Handelsbanken, 2004-2011. Annual Report, Stockholm: Handelsbanken. 
Hull, J. C., 2011. Fundamentals of Futures an Options Markets Seventh Edition. Boston: Pearson Education Inc.. 
Jacobs, M. J., Karagozoglu, A. K. & Peluso, C. M., 2010. Measuring Credit Risk: CDS Spreads vs. Credit 
Ratings. New York, s.n. 
Kendall, M., 1953. The Analysis of Economic Time Series, Part I: Prices. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society 96. 
Markit Indices Ltd., April, 2012. Markit Credit Indices A Primer, s.l.: Markit Indices Ltd.. 
Markit Indices Ltd., February, 2012. Markit iTraxx Europe Rules, s.l.: Markit Indices Ltd.. 
NÆS, R., Skjeltorp, J. A. & Ødegaard, B. A., 2011. Stock Market Liquidity and the Business Cycle. Journal 
of Finance, 66, pp. 139-176. 
Nordea, 2004-2011. Annual Reports, Stockholm: Nordea. 
Perloff, J., 2011. Microeconomics With Calculus 2nd Edition. Boston: Pearson Education Limited. 
Reinganum, M. R., March, 1981. Misspecification of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical Anomalies Based on 
Earnings' Yields and Market Values. Journal of Financial Economics 9, pp. 19-46. 
Roll, R., 1983. The Turn-of-the-year Effect and the Return Premium of Small Firms. Journal of Portfolio 
Management, pp. 18-28. 
Ross, S., 1976. The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing. Journal of Economic Theory, 13, pp. 341-360. 
Macroeconomic Forces and Their Effects   
 on the Swedish Banking Sector  Johansson Prakt & Larsson 
  
   
39 | P a g e  
 
SEB, 2004-2011. Annual Reports, Stockholm: SEB. 
Sharpe, W. F., September 1964. Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of 
Risk. The Journal of Finance, Volume 19, Issue 3 , pp. 425-442. 
Swedbank, 2004-2011. Annual Reports, Stockholm: Swedbank. 
The Swedish Energy Agency, 2011. Energiläget i siffror, u.o.: u.n. 
Wissén, P. & Wallgren, A., 2009. De svenska finansmarknaderna. In: Marknad och politik 8th edition. 
Stockholm: SNS Förlag, pp. 276-309. 
 
  
Macroeconomic Forces and Their Effects   
 on the Swedish Banking Sector  Johansson Prakt & Larsson 
  
   
40 | P a g e  
 
7. APPENDIX: ECONOMETRICAL STUDY  
7.1 CORRELATION BETWEEN DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
To find out to what extent stock returns are correlated a correlation matrix was generated using STATA. 
Results are presented in Table A.1.  
TABLE A. 1 
 
The results indicate that some correlation between the dependent variables exists. The regression is run on 
the whole period and includes 1775 observations. This is only to illustrate that there is a relationship 
between the dependent variables. Because this is simply for illustration purposes no results for the 
periods before and after the crash are presented here.   
7.2 REGRESSION ON ONE VARIABLE 
The starting point in many econometrical works is simply to run the regression on one variable to see how 
the explanatory variable affects the independent variable. This is illustrated in the four tables that follow. 
Usually it is not enough to only use one variable when trying to explain variations in the explanatory 
variable. One problem that may occur when doing this is omitted variable bias. The method used in the 
following regressions is OLS (Ordinary Least Squares).  
A negative sign on the coefficient indicates a negative relationship between CDS-spreads and stock prices. 
That is, an upward movement in CDS-spreads causes stock returns to be negative and a positive sign 
means that a positive change in CDS-spreads is followed by an increase in stock returns. 
The explanatory variable is changes in CDS-spreads and the regression is run on all periods and all 
dependent variables. Commentaries do not follow after each regression but later in this appendix 
regressions with more variables are presented and if comparing these regressions with those that are done 
here, it is obvious that the results differ both in significance and magnitude of the coefficient.  
handelsban~n     0.6601   0.7555   0.7410   1.0000
         seb     0.8084   0.7573   1.0000
      nordea     0.6870   1.0000
    swedbank     1.0000
                                                  
               swedbank   nordea      seb handel~n
(obs=1776)
. corr swedbank nordea seb handelsbanken
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TABLE A. 2: SWEDBANK ONLY ON CDS BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 3: SWEDBANK ONLY ON CDS AFTER THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 4: SWEDBANK ONLY ON CDS FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0001653    .000622     0.27   0.791    -.0010556    .0013862
      CDS_Re    -.1371806   .0121397   -11.30   0.000     -.161007   -.1133542
                                                                              
    swedbank        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     .33928422   876  .000387311           Root MSE      =  .01839
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1264
    Residual    .296076374   875  .000338373           R-squared     =  0.1274
       Model    .043207846     1  .043207846           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   875) =  127.69
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     877
. reg swedbank CDS_Re
                                                                              
       _cons     .0012256   .0011456     1.07   0.285    -.0010228    .0034739
      CDS_Re    -.3291789   .0242173   -13.59   0.000    -.3767082   -.2816497
                                                                              
    swedbank        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.27265157   897  .001418787           Root MSE      =  .03432
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1700
    Residual    1.05508509   896   .00117755           R-squared     =  0.1710
       Model     .21756648     1   .21756648           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   896) =  184.76
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     898
. reg swedbank CDS_Re
                                                                              
       _cons     .0007517   .0006654     1.13   0.259    -.0005533    .0020567
      CDS_Re     -.226846   .0134994   -16.80   0.000    -.2533225   -.2003696
                                                                              
    swedbank        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.61236453  1774  .000908886           Root MSE      =  .02801
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1369
    Residual    1.39084929  1773  .000784461           R-squared     =  0.1374
       Model    .221515237     1  .221515237           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,  1773) =  282.38
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1775
. reg swedbank CDS_Re
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TABLE A. 5: NORDEA ONLY ON CDS BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 6: NORDEA ONLY ON CDS AFTER THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 7: NORDEA ONLY ON CDS FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
                                                                              
       _cons      .000689   .0005187     1.33   0.184     -.000329    .0017071
      CDS_Re    -.1067843   .0101234   -10.55   0.000    -.1266532   -.0869153
                                                                              
      nordea        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .232071881   876  .000264922           Root MSE      =  .01534
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1118
    Residual     .20589053   875  .000235303           R-squared     =  0.1128
       Model    .026181351     1  .026181351           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   875) =  111.27
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     877
. reg nordea CDS_Re
                                                                              
       _cons      .000561   .0008888     0.63   0.528    -.0011834    .0023054
      CDS_Re    -.2676328    .018789   -14.24   0.000    -.3045083   -.2307573
                                                                              
      nordea        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .778915804   897  .000868357           Root MSE      =  .02662
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1837
    Residual    .635099996   896  .000708817           R-squared     =  0.1846
       Model    .143815808     1  .143815808           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   896) =  202.90
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     898
. reg nordea CDS_Re
                                                                              
       _cons     .0006659   .0005259     1.27   0.206    -.0003655    .0016972
      CDS_Re      -.18176   .0106692   -17.04   0.000    -.2026856   -.1608344
                                                                              
      nordea        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.01100611  1774  .000569902           Root MSE      =  .02214
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1402
    Residual    .868793596  1773  .000490013           R-squared     =  0.1407
       Model    .142212518     1  .142212518           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,  1773) =  290.22
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1775
. reg nordea CDS_Re
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TABLE A. 8: SEB ONLY ON CDS BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 9: SEB ONLY ON CDS AFTER THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 10: SEB ONLY ON CDS FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0004771   .0006292     0.76   0.449    -.0007578    .0017119
      CDS_Re    -.1466175   .0122789   -11.94   0.000    -.1707171   -.1225179
                                                                              
         seb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .352262748   876  .000402126           Root MSE      =  .01861
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1391
    Residual    .302905725   875  .000346178           R-squared     =  0.1401
       Model    .049357023     1  .049357023           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   875) =  142.58
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     877
. reg seb CDS_Re
                                                                              
       _cons     .0008493   .0011668     0.73   0.467    -.0014408    .0031393
      CDS_Re    -.3290985   .0246663   -13.34   0.000    -.3775088   -.2806881
                                                                              
         seb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.31202714   897  .001462684           Root MSE      =  .03495
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1648
    Residual    1.09456696   896  .001221615           R-squared     =  0.1657
       Model    .217460175     1  .217460175           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   896) =  178.01
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     898
. reg seb CDS_Re
                                                                              
       _cons     .0007127   .0006754     1.06   0.291     -.000612    .0020374
      CDS_Re    -.2317492   .0137031   -16.91   0.000    -.2586251   -.2048732
                                                                              
         seb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.66433556  1774  .000938182           Root MSE      =  .02843
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1384
    Residual    1.43314098  1773  .000808314           R-squared     =  0.1389
       Model    .231194582     1  .231194582           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,  1773) =  286.02
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1775
. reg seb CDS_Re
Macroeconomic Forces and Their Effects   
 on the Swedish Banking Sector  Johansson Prakt & Larsson 
  
   
44 | P a g e  
 
TABLE A. 11: HANDELSBANKEN ONLY ON CDS BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 12: HANDELSBANKEN ONLY ON CDS AFTER THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 13: HANDELSBANKEN ONLY ON CDS FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
                                                                              
       _cons      .000352    .000515     0.68   0.494    -.0006588    .0013628
      CDS_Re    -.0996203   .0100508    -9.91   0.000    -.1193468   -.0798938
                                                                              
handelsban~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .225735341   876  .000257689           Root MSE      =  .01523
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0999
    Residual    .202949079   875  .000231942           R-squared     =  0.1009
       Model    .022786261     1  .022786261           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   875) =   98.24
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     877
. reg handelsbanken CDS_Re
                                                                              
       _cons     .0009059   .0007993     1.13   0.257    -.0006627    .0024745
      CDS_Re    -.2135704   .0168957   -12.64   0.000    -.2467303   -.1804106
                                                                              
handelsban~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .605141561   897  .000674628           Root MSE      =  .02394
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1504
    Residual    .513559532   896  .000573169           R-squared     =  0.1513
       Model    .091582029     1  .091582029           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   896) =  159.78
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     898
. reg handelsbanken CDS_Re
                                                                              
       _cons     .0006619   .0004822     1.37   0.170    -.0002839    .0016076
      CDS_Re    -.1528258   .0097831   -15.62   0.000    -.1720133   -.1336382
                                                                              
handelsban~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .831002859  1774  .000468435           Root MSE      =   .0203
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1205
    Residual    .730463875  1773  .000411993           R-squared     =  0.1210
       Model    .100538984     1  .100538984           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,  1773) =  244.03
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1775
. reg handelsbanken CDS_Re
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7.3 GENERATING UNANTICIPATED CHANGE IN OIL-PRICE 
Results that are presented in the tables above probably suffer from omitted variable bias. A natural step is 
then to include more explanatory variables. The variable referred to in the data section as unanticipated 
change in oil-price is generated using an Auto Regressive Model of Order One. The first step is to 
generate lagged variables for oil prices. Secondly the AR 1 model is run with oil price as the dependent 
variable and the one day lagged variable as the explanatory variable.  The same principle is followed for 
all periods. For illustration purposes a regression is presented but only for one period. When this is done 
for the whole period results are as follow: 
TABLE A. 14 
 
 
It is clear from the table that one day lagged oil is highly significant and that it according to the R-square 
measure explains 99.52% of the variation in oil price. The variable of interest is the error term from this 
regression. That is so to speak the variation in oil-price which is not explained by the model. The 
following step is to use a simple command in STATA to predict this variable. When the error term is 
generated it can be included as one of seven explanatory variables that are to be tested.  
7.4 A MULTIFACTOR MODEL 
The method used to run the multifactor model with seven explanatory variables is OLS. P-values for CDS-
spreads are for many banks very different when including more variables. Results will not be further 
discussed or analyzed in this section because further tests and adjustments need to be done before it is 
possible to conduct an appropriate analysis of the results. These tests and adjustments are to be presented 
in this appendix.  
                                                                              
       _cons     .1819282   .1376675     1.32   0.187    -.0880794    .4519358
  Lagged_Oil     .9982027   .0016506   604.75   0.000     .9949654     1.00144
                                                                              
         Oil        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1002069.31  1774  564.864324           Root MSE      =  1.6513
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9952
    Residual    4834.51702  1773  2.72674395           R-squared     =  0.9952
       Model    997234.794     1  997234.794           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,  1773) =       .
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1775
. reg Oil Lagged_Oil
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TABLE A. 15: SWEDBANK ESTIMATED USING OLS BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 16: SWEDBANK ESTIMATED USING OLS AFTER THE CRASH 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0011253   .0006439    -1.75   0.081    -.0023892    .0001385
        u_Oil    -.0004103   .0002846    -1.44   0.150    -.0009689    .0001482
   amihud2002     16.54325   10.96017     1.51   0.132    -4.968293    38.05479
YieldCurve_Re     .0323062   .0420829     0.77   0.443    -.0502899    .1149022
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0053168   .0175079     0.30   0.761     -.029046    .0396796
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.0837695   .1571167    -0.53   0.594    -.3921426    .2246036
 OMX_Index_Re      1.11276   .0372153    29.90   0.000     1.039718    1.185803
       CDS_Re    -.0260434   .0092701    -2.81   0.005    -.0442379   -.0078489
                                                                               
     swedbank        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .337822839   875  .000386083           Root MSE      =  .01284
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5730
    Residual    .143097847   868  .000164859           R-squared     =  0.5764
       Model    .194724992     7  .027817856           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   868) =  168.74
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     876
. reg swedbank CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil
                                                                               
        _cons     .0012571   .0013254     0.95   0.343    -.0013442    .0038583
        u_Oil     .0005732    .000491     1.17   0.243    -.0003905    .0015369
   amihud2002     -12.0675   10.39435    -1.16   0.246     -32.4678      8.3328
YieldCurve_Re     .0055311   .0055308     1.00   0.318    -.0053239    .0163861
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0051349   .0023152     2.22   0.027      .000591    .0096788
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.1770145   .1462427    -1.21   0.226    -.4640353    .1100062
 OMX_Index_Re     1.397467   .0572038    24.43   0.000     1.285197    1.509737
       CDS_Re    -.0334885   .0211758    -1.58   0.114    -.0750489    .0080719
                                                                               
     swedbank        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.27265157   897  .001418787           Root MSE      =  .02545
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5435
    Residual    .576378576   890  .000647616           R-squared     =  0.5471
       Model    .696272997     7  .099467571           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   890) =  153.59
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     898
. reg swedbank CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil
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TABLE A. 17: SWEDBANK ESTIMATED USING OLS FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
TABLE A. 18: NORDEA ESTIMATED USING OLS BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
                                                                               
        _cons     .0000365   .0006844     0.05   0.958    -.0013058    .0013787
         uoil     .0006766   .0003108     2.18   0.030     .0000671     .001286
   amihud2002    -2.565655   6.847802    -0.37   0.708     -15.9963    10.86499
YieldCurve_Re     .0061762   .0043971     1.40   0.160     -.002448    .0148003
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0053211   .0018409     2.89   0.004     .0017105    .0089317
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.2191416   .1036973    -2.11   0.035    -.4225238   -.0157594
 OMX_Index_Re     1.283137   .0363343    35.31   0.000     1.211875      1.3544
       CDS_Re    -.0276888   .0110103    -2.51   0.012    -.0492835   -.0060942
                                                                               
     swedbank        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.61236453  1774  .000908886           Root MSE      =  .02031
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5461
    Residual    .728956661  1767  .000412539           R-squared     =  0.5479
       Model     .88340787     7  .126201124           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,  1767) =  305.91
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1775
. reg swedbank CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 uoil
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0011106   .0004621    -2.40   0.016    -.0020176   -.0002036
        u_Oil    -.0002911   .0002042    -1.43   0.154     -.000692    .0001097
   amihud2002     29.28401   7.865551     3.72   0.000     13.84628    44.72173
YieldCurve_Re     .0272224   .0302007     0.90   0.368    -.0320525    .0864974
 SWE_TBill_Re     -.005418   .0125645    -0.43   0.666    -.0300784    .0192424
  SEK_EURO_Re     .0303576   .1127546     0.27   0.788    -.1909458    .2516611
 OMX_Index_Re     1.035727   .0267075    38.78   0.000     .9833083    1.088146
       CDS_Re    -.0033941   .0066527    -0.51   0.610    -.0164513    .0096632
                                                                               
       nordea        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .230335752   875  .000263241           Root MSE      =  .00921
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6775
    Residual    .073698143   868  .000084906           R-squared     =  0.6800
       Model    .156637609     7  .022376801           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   868) =  263.55
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     876
. reg nordea CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil
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TABLE A. 19: NORDEA ESTIMATED USING OLS AFTER THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 20: NORDEA ESTIMATED USING OLS FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0003072   .0005234    -0.59   0.557    -.0013344      .00072
        u_Oil    -.0000849   .0003002    -0.28   0.777    -.0006741    .0005043
YieldCurve_Re    -.0038176   .0033877    -1.13   0.260    -.0104665    .0028312
 SWE_TBill_Re    -.0004572   .0014201    -0.32   0.748    -.0032443    .0023299
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.1799212   .0895416    -2.01   0.045    -.3556581   -.0041842
 OMX_Index_Re     1.303172   .0348377    37.41   0.000     1.234798    1.371545
       CDS_Re     .0009931   .0129625     0.08   0.939    -.0244474    .0264336
                                                                               
       nordea        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .778915804   897  .000868357           Root MSE      =  .01561
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7194
    Residual     .21708874   891  .000243646           R-squared     =  0.7213
       Model    .561827064     6  .093637844           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   891) =  384.32
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     898
. reg nordea CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re u_Oil
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0011077   .0004375    -2.53   0.011    -.0019658   -.0002495
         uoil    -.0001859   .0001987    -0.94   0.350    -.0005755    .0002038
   amihud2002     14.80156    4.37796     3.38   0.001     6.215038    23.38809
YieldCurve_Re     -.003138   .0028112    -1.12   0.264    -.0086516    .0023757
 SWE_TBill_Re    -.0004687   .0011769    -0.40   0.690     -.002777    .0018396
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.2374981   .0662961    -3.58   0.000    -.3675251   -.1074711
 OMX_Index_Re     1.212922   .0232294    52.22   0.000     1.167362    1.258481
       CDS_Re    -.0010853   .0070392    -0.15   0.877    -.0148912    .0127207
                                                                               
       nordea        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.01100611  1774  .000569902           Root MSE      =  .01299
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7041
    Residual    .297949703  1767  .000168619           R-squared     =  0.7053
       Model    .713056411     7  .101865202           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,  1767) =  604.11
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1775
. reg nordea CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 uoil
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TABLE A. 21: SEB ESTIMATED USING OLS BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 22: SEB ESTIMATED USING OLS AFTER THE CRASH 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0016116   .0005751    -2.80   0.005    -.0027403    -.000483
        u_Oil    -.0004154   .0002541    -1.63   0.103    -.0009142    .0000834
   amihud2002      34.2088   9.787742     3.50   0.000     14.99839    53.41921
YieldCurve_Re     .0396398   .0375812     1.05   0.292    -.0341208    .1134004
 SWE_TBill_Re      -.00639    .015635    -0.41   0.683    -.0370769    .0242969
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.2340571   .1403096    -1.67   0.096     -.509443    .0413287
 OMX_Index_Re     1.230886   .0332343    37.04   0.000     1.165656    1.296115
       CDS_Re    -.0233479   .0082785    -2.82   0.005    -.0395961   -.0070997
                                                                               
          seb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .351027799   875  .000401175           Root MSE      =  .01147
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6723
    Residual    .114120401   868  .000131475           R-squared     =  0.6749
       Model    .236907398     7  .033843914           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   868) =  257.42
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     876
. reg seb CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0002321   .0007651    -0.30   0.762    -.0017337    .0012694
        u_Oil     .0014019   .0004388     3.19   0.001     .0005407    .0022632
YieldCurve_Re    -.0004738   .0049523    -0.10   0.924    -.0101934    .0092457
 SWE_TBill_Re    -.0013757   .0020759    -0.66   0.508      -.00545    .0026985
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.1991161   .1308952    -1.52   0.129    -.4560148    .0577827
 OMX_Index_Re     1.608958    .050927    31.59   0.000     1.509007    1.708909
       CDS_Re     .0093891    .018949     0.50   0.620    -.0278007     .046579
                                                                               
          seb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.31202714   897  .001462684           Root MSE      =  .02282
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6440
    Residual    .463911291   891  .000520664           R-squared     =  0.6464
       Model    .848115848     6  .141352641           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   891) =  271.49
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     898
. reg seb CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re u_Oil
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TABLE A. 23: SEB ESTIMATED USING OLS FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
TABLE A. 24: HANDELSBANKEN ESTIMATED USING OLS BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0005361   .0006192    -0.87   0.387    -.0017505    .0006783
         uoil    -.0000625   .0002812    -0.22   0.824     -.000614    .0004889
   amihud2002     5.174106   6.195515     0.84   0.404    -6.977203    17.32542
YieldCurve_Re    -.0003293   .0039783    -0.08   0.934     -.008132    .0074733
 SWE_TBill_Re    -.0012323   .0016656    -0.74   0.459     -.004499    .0020343
  SEK_EURO_Re     -.283648   .0938196    -3.02   0.003    -.4676571    -.099639
 OMX_Index_Re     1.469668   .0328733    44.71   0.000     1.405193    1.534143
       CDS_Re    -.0112415   .0099616    -1.13   0.259    -.0307792    .0082962
                                                                               
          seb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    1.66433556  1774  .000938182           Root MSE      =  .01838
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6401
    Residual    .596697322  1767  .000337689           R-squared     =  0.6415
       Model    1.06763824     7  .152519749           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,  1767) =  451.66
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1775
. reg seb CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 uoil
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0008522   .0005414    -1.57   0.116    -.0019149    .0002105
        u_Oil     .0000392   .0002393     0.16   0.870    -.0004304    .0005089
   amihud2002     17.26806   9.215677     1.87   0.061    -.8195529    35.35568
YieldCurve_Re     .0113139   .0353847     0.32   0.749    -.0581356    .0807635
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0057834   .0147212     0.39   0.695    -.0231099    .0346768
  SEK_EURO_Re         .022   .1321089     0.17   0.868    -.2372903    .2812904
 OMX_Index_Re     .9128199   .0312919    29.17   0.000     .8514033    .9742365
       CDS_Re    -.0093101   .0077946    -1.19   0.233    -.0246086    .0059885
                                                                               
handelsbanken        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .225072719   875  .000257226           Root MSE      =   .0108
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5469
    Residual    .101170225   868  .000116556           R-squared     =  0.5505
       Model    .123902495     7  .017700356           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   868) =  151.86
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     876
. reg handelsbanken CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil
Macroeconomic Forces and Their Effects   
 on the Swedish Banking Sector  Johansson Prakt & Larsson 
  
   
51 | P a g e  
 
TABLE A. 25: HANDELSBANKEN ESTIMATED USING OLS AFTER THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 26: HANDELSBANKEN ESTIMATED USING OLS FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
  
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0005682   .0007766    -0.73   0.465    -.0020924    .0009559
        u_Oil     .0000561   .0002871     0.20   0.845    -.0005073    .0006196
   amihud2002     6.711644   6.085703     1.10   0.270     -5.23234    18.65563
YieldCurve_Re    -.0011489   .0032341    -0.36   0.723    -.0074962    .0051985
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0015153   .0013578     1.12   0.265    -.0011496    .0041802
 OMX_Index_Re     1.152073   .0310056    37.16   0.000     1.091221    1.212926
       CDS_Re     .0203085    .012418     1.64   0.102    -.0040634    .0446804
                                                                               
handelsbanken        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .605141561   897  .000674628           Root MSE      =  .01493
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6698
    Residual    .198501028   891  .000222785           R-squared     =  0.6720
       Model    .406640533     6  .067773422           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   891) =  304.21
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     898
. reg handelsbanken CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil
                                                                               
        _cons     -.000737   .0004398    -1.68   0.094    -.0015996    .0001257
         uoil     .0001854   .0001997     0.93   0.353    -.0002063    .0005772
   amihud2002     10.50236   4.401089     2.39   0.017     1.870466    19.13424
YieldCurve_Re    -.0018635    .002826    -0.66   0.510    -.0074063    .0036792
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0014375   .0011832     1.22   0.225     -.000883    .0037581
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.2789827   .0666463    -4.19   0.000    -.4096966   -.1482687
 OMX_Index_Re     1.032125   .0233521    44.20   0.000     .9863239    1.077925
       CDS_Re     .0050042   .0070764     0.71   0.480    -.0088747    .0188831
                                                                               
handelsbanken        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
       Total    .831002859  1774  .000468435           Root MSE      =  .01305
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6362
    Residual    .301106189  1767  .000170405           R-squared     =  0.6377
       Model     .52989667     7  .075699524           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,  1767) =  444.23
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1775
. reg handelsbanken CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 uoil
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7.5 TEST FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY  
To test for multicollinearity a simple correlation matrix is presented. Multicollinearity is a 
common problem in econometrical works but it is generally accepted as long as there is no 
perfect correlation between any explanatory variables.   
TABLE A. 27: TEST FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 28: TEST FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY AFTER THE CRASH 
 
TABLE A. 29: TEST FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
According to the correlation matrix there are no severe problems with multicollinearity. 
 
 
  
       u_Oil     0.0172   0.0129  -0.0689   0.0053   0.0443  -0.0683   1.0000
  amihud2002     0.0176  -0.0504   0.0654   0.0581  -0.0297   1.0000
YieldCurve~e    -0.0994   0.0997  -0.1883   0.0309   1.0000
SWE_TBill_Re     0.0611  -0.0148  -0.0175   1.0000
 SEK_EURO_Re     0.0328  -0.1394   1.0000
OMX_Index_Re    -0.3940   1.0000
      CDS_Re     1.0000
                                                                             
                 CDS_Re OMX_In~e SEK_EU~e SWE_TB~e YieldC~e ami~2002    u_Oil
(obs=876)
. corr CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil
       u_Oil    -0.1247   0.0022   0.0642   0.0188  -0.0113  -0.0849   1.0000
  amihud2002     0.0269   0.0794   0.0177  -0.0006  -0.0547   1.0000
YieldCurve~e    -0.0674   0.0550  -0.0992   0.0499   1.0000
SWE_TBill_Re    -0.0542   0.0317  -0.0278   1.0000
 SEK_EURO_Re     0.2367  -0.4408   1.0000
OMX_Index_Re    -0.5093   1.0000
      CDS_Re     1.0000
                                                                             
                 CDS_Re OMX_In~e SEK_EU~e SWE_TB~e YieldC~e ami~2002    u_Oil
(obs=898)
. corr CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil
        uoil    -0.2054   0.3127  -0.2164   0.0312   0.0270  -0.0207   1.0000
  amihud2002     0.0142   0.0475   0.0193   0.0202  -0.0379   1.0000
YieldCurve~e    -0.0511   0.0493  -0.0961   0.0508   1.0000
SWE_TBill_Re    -0.0346   0.0259  -0.0265   1.0000
 SEK_EURO_Re     0.1581  -0.3665   1.0000
OMX_Index_Re    -0.4497   1.0000
      CDS_Re     1.0000
                                                                             
                 CDS_Re OMX_In~e SEK_EU~e SWE_TB~e YieldC~e ami~2002     uoil
(obs=1775)
. corr CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 uoil
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7.6 TEST FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY 
In this section a test for heteroskedasticity is performed. The test characteristics are described in more 
detail in the methodology section and results summarized for all examined periods are presented in table 
A.30.  
TEST DETAILS 
 
TABLE A. 30 
Dependent 
Variable 
Chi-
Square P-Value 
Reject H0 at 
5% 
significance? Heteroskedasticity? 
Before Crash     
Swedbank 42.42 0.0000 Yes Yes 
Nordea 47.01 0.0000 Yes Yes 
SEB 38.59 0.0000 Yes Yes 
Handelsbanken 15.97 0.0254 Yes Yes 
After Crash     
Swedbank 15.39 0.0313 Yes Yes 
Nordea 45.48 0.0000 Yes Yes 
SEB 78.41 0.0000 Yes Yes 
Handelsbanken 26.15 0.0005 Yes Yes 
Whole Period     
Swedbank 158.53 0.0000 Yes Yes 
Nordea 166.37 0.0000 Yes Yes 
SEB 341.89 0.0000 Yes Yes 
Handelsbanken 81.01 0.0000 Yes Yes 
 
Table A.30 indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity for all dependent variables in all periods. In the 
presence of heteroskedasticity OLS is no longer the best linear unbiased estimator. To receive more 
accurate results it is therefore necessary to adjust for heteroskedasticity. These adjustments will be 
presented later in this appendix.  
  
Breush-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Test type: Chi-Square 
Significance level: 5% 
H0: Constant variance (no heteroskedasticity)  
H1: No Constant variance (heteroskedasticity)  
Rejection Rule: Reject H0, for P-values above 0.05 
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7.7 TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION 
In this section a test for autocorrelation is performed. The test that has been used is the alternative Durbin-
Watson test for autocorrelation. Test characteristics are described in more detail in the methodology 
section and results summarized for all examined periods and variables are presented in table A.31. 
TEST DETAILS 
 
TABLE A. 31 
Dependent 
Variable 
Chi-
Square P-Value 
Reject H0 at 
5% 
significance? Autocorrelation? 
Before Crash     
Swedbank 5.284 0.0215 Yes Yes 
Nordea 0.136 0.7119 No No 
SEB 0.151 0.6971 No No 
Handelsbanken 2.207 0.1374 No No 
After Crash     
Swedbank 0.008 0.9284 No No 
Nordea 0.019 0.8917 No No 
SEB 22.612 0.000 Yes Yes 
Handelsbanken 3.265 0.0708 No No 
Whole Period     
Swedbank 0.944 0.3313 No No 
Nordea 0.016 0.8981 No No 
SEB 25.886 0.0000 Yes Yes 
Handelsbanken 6.465 0.0110 Yes Yes 
 
Table A.31 indicates that autocorrelation is present in some of the examined regressions. Regressions 
which suffer from autocorrelation need to be adjusted.  
  
Durbin-Watson Alternative Test for Autocorrelation 
Test type: Chi-Square 
Significance level: 5% 
H0: No Serial Correlation 
H1: Serial Correlation 
Rejection Rule: Reject H0, for P-values above 0.05. 
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7.8 ADJUSTING FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY & AUTOCORRELATION 
Tests showed that adjustments for heteroskedasticity need to be performed on all dependent variables in 
all periods. Adjustments for autocorrelation are only necessary for some periods and variables. The 
estimation method used to correct for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity is the Newey-West 
estimation method available in the STATA software. This method allows the user to always adjust for 
heteroskedasticity, and when it is necessary also adjust for autocorrelation. The procedure is 
straightforward. The command used in STATA is Newey followed by the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables. When to adjust only for heteroskedasticity and not for autocorrelation the syntax 
“lag (0)” is used after the last explanatory variable. When to adjust for both autocorrelation of order one, 
which has been examined here, and heteroskedasticity use the syntax lag (1) after the last explanatory 
variable.  
TABLE A. 32: SWEDBANK BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: YES 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0011253   .0007301    -1.54   0.124    -.0025584    .0003077
        u_Oil    -.0004103   .0003147    -1.30   0.193     -.001028    .0002073
   amihud2002     16.54325   15.42822     1.07   0.284    -13.73773    46.82423
YieldCurve_Re     .0323062   .0370664     0.87   0.384    -.0404441    .1050564
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0053168   .0125192     0.42   0.671    -.0192546    .0298882
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.0837695   .1415847    -0.59   0.554     -.361658    .1941189
 OMX_Index_Re      1.11276   .0425195    26.17   0.000     1.029307    1.196213
       CDS_Re    -.0260434   .0103415    -2.52   0.012    -.0463408    -.005746
                                                                               
     swedbank        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 1                                      F(  7,   868)  =    123.43
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =       876
. newey swedbank CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil, lag(1)
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TABLE A. 33: SWEDBANK AFTER THE CRASH 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: NO 
TABLE A. 34: SWEDBANK THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: NO 
                                                                               
        _cons     .0012571   .0013593     0.92   0.355    -.0014107    .0039248
        u_Oil     .0005732   .0005633     1.02   0.309    -.0005325    .0016788
   amihud2002     -12.0675   11.75664    -1.03   0.305    -35.14147    11.00646
YieldCurve_Re     .0055311   .0053253     1.04   0.299    -.0049206    .0159828
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0051349   .0035074     1.46   0.144    -.0017488    .0120187
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.1770145   .1970171    -0.90   0.369    -.5636869    .2096578
 OMX_Index_Re     1.397467   .0791909    17.65   0.000     1.242044    1.552889
       CDS_Re    -.0334885    .023711    -1.41   0.158    -.0800246    .0130476
                                                                               
     swedbank        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 0                                      F(  7,   890)  =     90.37
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =       898
. newey swedbank CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil, lag(0)
                                                                               
        _cons     .0000365   .0006855     0.05   0.958    -.0013081     .001381
         uoil     .0006766   .0003594     1.88   0.060    -.0000282    .0013813
   amihud2002    -2.565655   8.940614    -0.29   0.774    -20.10095    14.96964
YieldCurve_Re     .0061762   .0054864     1.13   0.260    -.0045843    .0169366
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0053211   .0035395     1.50   0.133    -.0016209    .0122631
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.2191416   .1635203    -1.34   0.180    -.5398551    .1015719
 OMX_Index_Re     1.283137   .0507956    25.26   0.000     1.183512    1.382763
       CDS_Re    -.0276888   .0121052    -2.29   0.022    -.0514308   -.0039469
                                                                               
     swedbank        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 0                                      F(  7,  1767)  =    149.04
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =      1775
. newey swedbank CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 uoil, lag(0)
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TABLE A. 35: NORDEA BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: NO 
TABLE A. 36: NORDEA AFTER THE CRASH 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: NO 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0011106   .0004757    -2.33   0.020    -.0020442    -.000177
        u_Oil    -.0002911   .0002213    -1.32   0.189    -.0007254    .0001431
   amihud2002     29.28401   9.932252     2.95   0.003     9.789968    48.77804
YieldCurve_Re     .0272224   .0292568     0.93   0.352    -.0301999    .0846448
 SWE_TBill_Re     -.005418   .0113873    -0.48   0.634     -.027768    .0169319
  SEK_EURO_Re     .0303576   .1082547     0.28   0.779    -.1821139    .2428291
 OMX_Index_Re     1.035727   .0342029    30.28   0.000     .9685972    1.102857
       CDS_Re    -.0033941   .0073305    -0.46   0.643    -.0177816    .0109935
                                                                               
       nordea        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 0                                      F(  7,   868)  =    164.40
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =       876
. newey nordea CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil, lag (0)
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0016443   .0007868    -2.09   0.037    -.0031884   -.0001001
        u_Oil    -.0000327   .0003466    -0.09   0.925     -.000713    .0006476
   amihud2002     13.70414   6.754581     2.03   0.043     .4473705     26.9609
YieldCurve_Re    -.0034333   .0014813    -2.32   0.021    -.0063405   -.0005261
 SWE_TBill_Re    -.0004715    .001341    -0.35   0.725    -.0031034    .0021605
  SEK_EURO_Re     -.191395   .1103768    -1.73   0.083    -.4080241    .0252342
 OMX_Index_Re     1.294198   .0537204    24.09   0.000     1.188764    1.399631
       CDS_Re    -.0007767   .0148268    -0.05   0.958    -.0298762    .0283228
                                                                               
       nordea        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 0                                      F(  7,   890)  =    183.85
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =       898
. newey nordea CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil, lag(0)
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TABLE A. 37: NORDEA THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: NO 
TABLE A. 38: SEB BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: NO 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0011077   .0004213    -2.63   0.009     -.001934   -.0002813
         uoil    -.0001859    .000224    -0.83   0.407    -.0006252    .0002534
   amihud2002     14.80156   5.402278     2.74   0.006     4.206036    25.39709
YieldCurve_Re     -.003138    .001553    -2.02   0.043    -.0061839    -.000092
 SWE_TBill_Re    -.0004687   .0012706    -0.37   0.712    -.0029607    .0020233
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.2374981   .0886813    -2.68   0.007    -.4114294   -.0635668
 OMX_Index_Re     1.212922   .0351064    34.55   0.000     1.144067    1.281776
       CDS_Re    -.0010853   .0079366    -0.14   0.891    -.0166514    .0144809
                                                                               
       nordea        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 0                                      F(  7,  1767)  =    287.05
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =      1775
. newey nordea CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 uoil, lag(0)
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0016116   .0006147    -2.62   0.009     -.002818   -.0004052
        u_Oil    -.0004154   .0002608    -1.59   0.112    -.0009272    .0000964
   amihud2002      34.2088   12.52781     2.73   0.006     9.620459    58.79715
YieldCurve_Re     .0396398   .0363367     1.09   0.276    -.0316783    .1109579
 SWE_TBill_Re      -.00639    .013365    -0.48   0.633    -.0326216    .0198416
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.2340571   .1408718    -1.66   0.097    -.5105463     .042432
 OMX_Index_Re     1.230886   .0409909    30.03   0.000     1.150433    1.311338
       CDS_Re    -.0233479   .0086301    -2.71   0.007    -.0402862   -.0064096
                                                                               
          seb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 0                                      F(  7,   868)  =    166.70
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =       876
. newey seb CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil, lag(0)
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TABLE A. 39: SEB AFTER THE CRASH 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: YES 
TABLE A. 40: SEB THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: YES 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0000579    .001228    -0.05   0.962    -.0024679    .0023522
        u_Oil     .0013951    .000468     2.98   0.003     .0004767    .0023136
   amihud2002    -1.786003   11.37305    -0.16   0.875    -24.10713    20.53513
YieldCurve_Re    -.0005239   .0022145    -0.24   0.813    -.0048703    .0038224
 SWE_TBill_Re    -.0013739   .0025061    -0.55   0.584    -.0062925    .0035447
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.1976208   .2042011    -0.97   0.333    -.5983926    .2031511
 OMX_Index_Re     1.610128   .0791433    20.34   0.000     1.454798    1.765457
       CDS_Re     .0096198   .0215897     0.45   0.656     -.032753    .0519925
                                                                               
          seb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 1                                      F(  7,   890)  =    101.60
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =       898
. newey seb CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil, lag(1)
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0005361   .0006028    -0.89   0.374    -.0017184    .0006462
         uoil    -.0000625   .0003242    -0.19   0.847    -.0006984    .0005733
   amihud2002     5.174106   8.656883     0.60   0.550     -11.8047    22.15292
YieldCurve_Re    -.0003293   .0025281    -0.13   0.896    -.0052877     .004629
 SWE_TBill_Re    -.0012323    .002602    -0.47   0.636    -.0063357     .003871
  SEK_EURO_Re     -.283648   .1716468    -1.65   0.099    -.6203002    .0530041
 OMX_Index_Re     1.469668   .0519847    28.27   0.000      1.36771    1.571626
       CDS_Re    -.0112415   .0106447    -1.06   0.291     -.032119     .009636
                                                                               
          seb        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 1                                      F(  7,  1767)  =    170.03
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =      1775
. newey seb CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 uoil, lag(1)
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TABLE A. 41: HANDELSBANKEN BEFORE THE CRASH 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: NO 
TABLE A. 42: HANDELSBANKEN AFTER THE CRASH 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: NO 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0008522   .0005388    -1.58   0.114    -.0019097    .0002054
        u_Oil     .0000392   .0002282     0.17   0.864    -.0004087    .0004871
   amihud2002     17.26806   9.187308     1.88   0.061    -.7638723        35.3
YieldCurve_Re     .0113139   .0300776     0.38   0.707    -.0477195    .0703473
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0057834   .0098912     0.58   0.559      -.01363    .0251968
  SEK_EURO_Re         .022   .1212621     0.18   0.856    -.2160011    .2600012
 OMX_Index_Re     .9128199   .0361278    25.27   0.000     .8419117     .983728
       CDS_Re    -.0093101     .00773    -1.20   0.229    -.0244817    .0058616
                                                                               
handelsbanken        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 0                                      F(  7,   868)  =    100.08
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =       876
. newey handelsbanken CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil, lag(0)
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0006864   .0007933    -0.87   0.387    -.0022434    .0008706
        u_Oil     .0001345   .0002961     0.45   0.650    -.0004466    .0007157
   amihud2002     7.961156   7.303027     1.09   0.276    -6.372006    22.29432
YieldCurve_Re    -.0020185   .0024744    -0.82   0.415    -.0068748    .0028379
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0014578   .0007034     2.07   0.039     .0000772    .0028384
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.2954181   .1293383    -2.28   0.023    -.5492618   -.0415744
 OMX_Index_Re     1.107921   .0440604    25.15   0.000     1.021447    1.194396
       CDS_Re     .0210925   .0136112     1.55   0.122    -.0056213    .0478062
                                                                               
handelsbanken        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 0                                      F(  7,   890)  =    147.15
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =       898
. newey handelsbanken CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 u_Oil, lag(0)
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TABLE A. 43: HANDELSBANKEN THE WHOLE PERIOD 
 
Adjusted for autocorrelation: YES 
 
                                                                               
        _cons     -.000737   .0004389    -1.68   0.093    -.0015978    .0001239
         uoil     .0001854    .000206     0.90   0.368    -.0002185    .0005894
   amihud2002     10.50236   5.594389     1.88   0.061    -.4699617    21.47467
YieldCurve_Re    -.0018635   .0026695    -0.70   0.485    -.0070991    .0033721
 SWE_TBill_Re     .0014375   .0007386     1.95   0.052     -.000011    .0028861
  SEK_EURO_Re    -.2789827   .1045565    -2.67   0.008      -.48405   -.0739153
 OMX_Index_Re     1.032125   .0320165    32.24   0.000     .9693303    1.094919
       CDS_Re     .0050042   .0075934     0.66   0.510    -.0098889    .0198972
                                                                               
handelsbanken        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Newey-West
                                                                               
                                                    Prob > F       =    0.0000
maximum lag: 1                                      F(  7,  1767)  =    206.11
Regression with Newey-West standard errors          Number of obs  =      1775
. newey handelsbanken CDS_Re OMX_Index_Re SEK_EURO_Re SWE_TBill_Re YieldCurve_Re amihud2002 uoil, lag(1)
